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The Defendant/Intervenors are Granite School District (hereinafter "Granite") and
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)G).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the Tax Court err in concluding that an agreement
between the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant to refund $5 million in
one lump sum payment as satisfaction for disputed valuation claims for property tax
years 1995-1999 was enforceable, legal and constitutional, where:
(1) a material condition precedent to the agreement failed when the Tax
Commission disapproved the agreement (This issue was preserved in the Tax Court at (R.
at 2548-49));
(2) the agreement expressly failed to address the constitutional and
statutory standard of fair market valuation, stating that settlement was neither indicative
nor dispositive of any valuation issue, thus ignoring constitutional and statutory mandates
of uniformity and equality and violating fundamental notions of fairness to all other
taxpayers (This issue was preserved in the Tax Court at (R. at 1700-02; 1804-06));
(3) the consideration for the agreement failed when the Board was forced
to try the matter before the Tax Commission (This issue was preserved in the Tax Court
at (R. at 2547-48));

1

(4) the agreement exceeded the Board's authority since there was no
statutory or common law authority permitting such a compromise of property taxes.
(This issue was preserved in the Tax Court at (R. at 1698-1700)); and
(5) the agreement violated public policy and was illegal because it failed
to allocate fair market value. (This issue was preserved in the Tax Court at (R. at 1806;
2545-47)).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This question presents an issue of law that
the appellate court reviews for correctness and affords no deference to the district court.
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the Tax Court err in finding that Granite had no
standing to contest the validity and enforceability of the agreement and have its position
as a party to the litigation ignored because its Motion to Intervene had not been ruled
upon nor granted before the agreement was reached by the Board and Alliant, even where
Granite was a party to the litigation prior to the Tax Court ruling on the validity of the
agreement? (This issue was preserved in the Tax Court at (R. at 1962-87)).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This question presents an issue of law that
the appellate court reviews for correctness and affords no deference to the district court.
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the Tax Court err in determining that it had continuing
jurisdiction over a failed or void agreement between the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization and Alliant to refund $5 million in one lump sum payment as satisfaction for
disputed valuation claims for property tax years 1995-1999 and in further concluding it

2

was enforceable, legal and constitutional where the Tax Commission was not given an
opportunity to fully explain its rejection of the Settlement Agreement. (This issue was
preserved in the Tax Court at (R. at 2544; 1396; 1803-07)).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This question presents an issue of law that
the appellate court reviews for correctness and affords no deference to the district court.
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2 (full provision set forth in appendix).
Utah Cost. Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (full provision set forth in appendix).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Although tax issues are at the heart of this matter, in essence, this is a relatively
simple dispute over the enforceability of a settlement agreement. At issue is whether a
tax settlement agreement between Salt Lake County and Alliant, for tax years 1995
through 1999, should be enforced. The settlement agreement was conditioned upon
approval of the Tax Commission, an approval that was never given. The consideration
for the agreement was in part the avoidance of a hearing before the Tax Commission on
the merits, a hearing which was ultimately held after the Tax Commission ruled in favor
of the County and Alliant appealed to the Tax Court. And the Settlement Agreement was
enforced without the consent of Granite, a third party intervenor. The Tax Court held
that, despite these contractual deficiencies, the settlement agreement was enforceable.

3

B.

Course of Proceedings

As with most tax cases, this case has had a somewhat torturous history involving
various administrative and judicial appeals and hearings. For each of the years, 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, the Assessor assessed taxes on Alliant's real and personal
property. Alliant initially challenged the Assessor's assessment for each of the tax years
to the Board. Alliant then appealed the Board's decision for 1995 and 1996 real property
tax assessment to the Tax Commission.
On November 16, 1999, following a formal hearing, the Tax Commission issued a
ruling for the 1995 and 1996 assessments. (R. at 2876-77). Both Alliant and the Board
appealed the Tax Commission's determination to the District Court. These District Court
appeals were consolidated into one action and are designated below in the Tax Court as
Third Dist. Civil No. 980901298 ("1995-1996 Valuation Case"). (R. at 2877). The
1995-1996 Valuation Case was consolidated and assigned to the Honorable Lynn W.
Davis of the Fourth Judicial District Court (the 'Tax Court").1 Id.
Alliant also appealed the Assessor's respective personal and real property
assessments for 1997, 1998 and 1999 to the Board. (R. at 1219-32; 2877). To facilitate
the resolution of these issues, Alliant agreed to uphold the Assessor's original

1

Alliant's property is located in Salt Lake County. These cases were originally appealed
to "Tax Court Judges" in the Third Judicial District. Generally because of conflicts, the
matters were ultimately assigned to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis of the Fourth Judicial
District Court. Unless otherwise noted, it is the proceedings before Judge Davis that are
referred to as the "Tax Court."

4

assessments at the county board level. No hearings were held. Alliant then appealed the
Board's decision for 1997 through 1999 to the Tax Commission.
On November 17, 2000, Granite filed a petition to intervene in the 1997-1999
appeal before the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission granted Granite's petition in
early 2001 and ruled that Granite was a party to the action effective November 17, 2000.
(R. at 1580-82).
On December 5, 2000, Alliant and the Board entered into a settlement for the
1995-1996 Valuation Case, as well as the administrative appeals for the 1997-1999 tax
years pending before the Tax Commission. (R. at 1411-12; 2876). The settlement was to
be a global resolution of all disputes involving tax years 1995 through 1999. (R. at 141112).
On December 7, 2000, Granite moved to intervene in the 1995-1996 Valuation
Case pending before the Tax Court. (R. at 1394-98). The Tax Court granted this motion
on February 14, 2001. (R. at 1603-06).
On December 15, 2000, Alliant and the Board filed a Joint Stipulation for
Settlement and Joint Motion for an Order Approving Settlement ("Joint Motion to
Approve Settlement") with both the Tax Court and the Tax Commission, as jurisdiction
for the disputed tax years was then split between the two entities. (R. at 1415-17). The
Assessor and Granite filed Memoranda in Opposition to the Joint Motion to Approve the
Settlement with both the Tax Court and the Tax Commission. (R. at 1693-1706; 17981806; 1835-52).

5

On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the Board's Joint
Motion for Approval of Settlement. (R. at 1813-21; 2878). The Tax Commission
determined that Granite had properly sought to intervene before the Settlement
Agreement had been reached, and therefore, the Settlement Agreement was not a
complete agreement of all necessary parties. (R. at 1817). Accordingly, the Tax
Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23 through April 27, 2001, to determine the
fair market value for the property in question for the years, 1997 through 1999. (R. at
2501-23). On September 18, 2001, the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("Final Decision"), wherein it substantially
sustained the valuations presented to the Tax Commission by the Assessor. (R. at 234682).
Although the Tax Court heard oral arguments on the Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement in March 2001, the Tax Court did not rule until September 2001. (R. at 196287). Specifically, on September 20, 2001, the Tax Court issued a memorandum decision
wherein it disapproved the Settlement Agreement. Id. The Tax Court based it's ruling in
part on it's finding that the "refund amount of $5 million is indivisible and non-allocable
between the various tax years" and since jurisdiction was split for the years 1995 through
1999 between the Tax Court and the Tax Commission, no allocation could be made. (R.
at 1963). As such, the Tax Court declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Id.)
On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third
District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-3601 of
the Tax Commission's Final Decision. (R. at 2384-97; 2878). The appeals of these years
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were consolidated into one actioi 1 and ai e designated belo \ ii 1 th z T ax Coi irt as I 'hird
c

Dist Ci - il T i a 0109C *8^f »7 m u I assio i n >i 1 to tl ic Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as a
Tax Court Judge (the ' 11*97 r K ' t; \ aluation Case"). Judge Nehring disqualified himself
from the 1997-1999 Valuation ('u>. ,'•* .vlinuie Lnaa JUL J V *\ a -a; v 2<S78'

Mi SAA ii ,is (lnnaipoi! jssipnnl "i • IiiJiaa P;i( Ii Htiati, itlmjj us a Tax Court

Judge. (R. at 2399; 2877).
Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the : • •
Valuation Case was Al.lia.iit' s ]\ lotion tc I i a nsfei i h
*

:

:

,^

i

^

\\ hicl I already

-n}(' \ aluation Case pending before it. v k. at 2311; 2877J. The Motion to

Transfer was granted on November 6, 2001. (R at 2399; 2876) On November 14, 2001,
Alliantfiled a Motion a -A .ua
1

, \;;ua ,, ;!.. *.i • <> \

.-:, .

K

' • :-aaj-;Jin and vacate the Tax Court's September

20, 2001 Order disapproving the Settlement Agreement (R. at 2405-06). This motion
was fully briefed and oral arguments held in Jainian .!()(i ", I In 1 a\ < i mi i i ulad m lane
.?00 " 111. • I I he Sadlanit al Vaiaaiiianf would ha aafohvd
After numerous additional briefings concerning the ultimate findings of facts and
conclusions of law, on June 30, 2003, the Tax ('ourt entered its Findings of I 'act,
Coma

,

.

i.. •• :!

v-

a Settlement Agreement.

(R. at 2866-81). Granite and the Assessor then appealed to this Court.
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C.

SI i,i I f,'"i 1 in,"i ni I! il" Material Facts

Alliant is a manufacturer of solid rocket propulsion systems and composite
structures facilities. At all times material ^ ;r.c issues raised herein, Alliant's 1 eal and
personal propeii\ \ \ J ^ stihftvl d assessm'-ni i«»i piopfii\ \,w pmpnses by the Assessor.
[lie Assessor is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to assess all non-exempt
property within his county that is not assessed by the Tax Commission at a uniform and
equal rate in proportion to iis \ aim* in u a ordana \\ nil l.i '
1 In• \ssessoi i

i^ued real and personal property tax assessments to Alliant for

tax years 1995 through i ^00. These assessments were subsequently appeaku o;. \ iant
to the Board and eventual!} I,K
spivt i \ .

., • -mmission.
i :uii from the Board, Alliant challenged its

1995 and 1996 property tax assessments through administrative proceedings before the
Tax Commission. On November 1 f r ) ; ^ . : -ii.^n.... a Mi:.ai
^ Miin.issi - ;s..

'^iwn

.

.umii.

,o -r.u* :iv effectively upholding the

Assessor's methodologies and valuation as adjusted by the Board for tlu \\\ o \ ears. Roth
Alliant and the Board appealed the Tax Commission's Li^Len:uiiuiii;i

:

H\ .Scpteaibci .'(Kill ilu I (>*>7 -1 Wl> real .iiu.l person;n property administrative
anneals were pending before the Tax Commission and the 1995 and 1996 appeals were
before the Tax Court. Specifically, the positions at that time oi J K Assessor, Alliant, tl le
Board and the I a\ t oinnnssmn \ JM IH -iiinoiaii/cil ;is follnws;
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I'AX YEARS PENDING BEFORE TAX COURT
VALUE
Assesor
Alliant's Position before Board
Board of Equalization Decision
Tax Commission Decision

1995
168,801,600
82,865,641
152,725,521
152,725,521

1996
168,003,500
82,965,641
168,003,500
168,003,500

lU. :|l 120.*).

T< A

X YEARS PENDING BEFORE TAX COMMlb i S

VALUE
Board (rounded)
Alliant's Position

1997
218,000,000
116,663,333

"

1998
219,000,000
116,373,132

1999
243,500,000
137,742,3542

In September, the Board and Affiant began discussing the possibility of settling the
uiilerjiivi- .ii^:-

•

•

-Mii.,

i settle and

filed a Motion to Intervene in the Tax Commission proceeding on November 17. 2000.
After the November elections, these discussions became more earnest and b\ v vember
.?()()(), Allianihad submiUcd a proposal seUlemcnl In llir \iu\tc (lurk Boani;1 After
,\L't>tui!i. >Hb, on December 5, 2000, the Board submitted a final settlement
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The Tax Commission's decision, which was reached after the Formal Hearing, held
April 23 - 27, 2001, determined the values to be: $215,210,000 (1997); $212,559,000
(1998); and $232,650,000 (1999). This decision substantially upheld the Assessor's
position setting the value at $218,000,000 (1997); $219,000,000 (1998) and 243,500,000
(1999. CR. at 2422).
J

For the years in question, the Salt Lake County Board ol bquaiization consisted of the
County's three elected County Commissioners. However, the voters of Salt Lake County
elected to adopt the Mayor-Council form of county government, a change that took place
effective January 1, 2001. (R. ai 1Si I;•.

9

counteroffer back (u Allianl in llie

IMIIII .JI .I L'IIIM

(111.1 ' S li'lrnn ni Amrniciif \t, \ copy

"I iIK1 Vltlemrnl V»reonient is contained in the Addendum at 1690-91.
Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Board agreed to refund five
million dollars ($5,000,000.0(1»to Alliant. The Settlement Ayivi men! pm\ nk\\ ili.il
" (nlo obsolescence percentage

• J P V I I " | v* ;is| applied to anv particular year under

appeal and any allocation of a reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund
calculation percentages onlv and shall be neithei ma; aii\ e oi di .posio
any issue oi.^v

'

^o\.-

i

o; i :

r^

.<>

ir \greement was also

conditioned upon "final appro\ al by the Utah State Tax Commission and the District
Court and entry of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to authorize > i

.ake

County and the ailooted kixinjj rnlilies w Minn Sill I ,.iko "ounh H i " v . ' i •

•' MI 's

.

.

. .^ ) M l l 0 1 1 0 f

an

appropriate judgment levy." (R. al 1690-1) 1).

The Settlement Agreement does not address several essential matters, including:
(1) setting or fix valuaiin! i. nj-..- ...p.n « tv ;...-• = = • : . .

..uli.^.m. i ,.

divisihiluv/severahiliiv of the !V;t million dollar settlement amount to separate years, even
though the Settlement Agreement spanned multiple tax years and multiple jurisdictions.
See (R .at 1690-91)
-:

\i m^ion meet inn on December 6, 2000, the County

Commission discussed the proposed settlement -w a: open meeting. The County
Attorney, the Assessor and Giainie. HK -ooo.- largest recipient of the pi opei t> tax
revenue thai was Hie subuvt nl llie dispiilr and Ihe parts responsible for approximately

fifty percent of the refund, or about $2.^ million, .all \nicnl lliru ubfeelHiiis to line
Settlement Agreement.

•

' •

Specifically, the Assessor urged the Board to reject the Settlement Agreement for
various reasons. The Assessor noted that since I1)*):*) when Alliant purchased II:.J p ; VJ\.
in question. (In- A^essoi's \ allien had h\ \ 11 upheld ;ii r\i i> sdnji ml I he administrative
appeals process, while Alliant had lost each appeal. (R. at 1687 The Assessor pointed
out that the Board had upheld the Assessor's valuation 1^ HK •< ,:\u
.

i .' \ o.uniiS'M.i.: u p n e i ^ u:. -

> •

y

n\ years, and

••

|>S" ,

in

' - e , • • , inted out that Alliant had failed on each ol us appeals, and there
was no basis for a tax refund.
David Yokum, the Count) Attorney speaking in I •. ilnal eapacih nf repiesuiting
the citizens of Salt I ake Coi tnty and representing ilk; Board, presented a detailed analysis
as to why the Settlement Agreement should not be approved, but that the matter should
proceed forward to a finisl I with the ' I ax Commission ai id tl le I ax Coi n t: Hie Coi n it>
poii the experience of qualified tax
attorneys and government tax attorneys, whose combined experience is well over 50
years." (R. at 1686). Moreover, Mi I nkum noted thai future years iviiiainul
unresoK ed and that if the i natter pi oceeded to conclusion in the administrative and tax
court appeals, a final resolution could be reached as to how to value the property in
question. (Id.)
hjinlly, t iiiinitt' aauied Ih.il llie Selllemeiil Agreement should he rejected because
it was neither economically justified nor did it resolve the dispute. The issues leading to
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tl le dispute dealt w ith iiietiiodolog} in determining v all le Hie Settlement , \,gi eement did
IKII

ivsohe ihis dispiilr iind *>n 1 \ inrnnt (hal (he parties would be back in the same

position each subsequent tax year. Granite also noted that the agreement would require
additional revenues through a judgment levy or the reduction in educational sei \ ices

The County Commission, however, rejected these concerns outright.
Commissioner Shurtleff stated that "[h]e felt [thnf it! vunreasona: . .:.*^. :. L

•

i

.« n

.: ne inappropriately

•* •->---*

.

•

i

•• ih;it

"I h|y settling this case, the Commission will be resolving a five-year dispute and avoid
having to pay an $11 million settlement later." 'R T 1 6° 1A Commissioner Overson
echoed those same concerns, argu:. >

• '

his c\\\xY'-"y.r.- - • iv : i : v uic County would lose - and therefore settlement was
preferred. ;K. ai l (> v*

\ecordingly, therefore, the Salt Lake County Commission

approved the Settlement Agreement on December 0. J( N" I
«\

iiervene in the Tax Court. (R. at 1975;.

This Motion was granted on February 14. 2001 As noted above, Granite had already
filed a similar motion with • :>. ; u\ v. v>mmissioii en :\o\, ;iii\.;
Oi I December 15, 2000 A lliai it and the Board filed a "Stipulation for Settlement
and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving Settlement" with (he
Tax Court and the Tax Commission, The Assessor and Granite both liled Memo1-. --.^ ;
Opposition In (In11 IIMIII KlHiPii lt» A|)|>n»\e liie SVltlenKiil wilii l»nih I he Tax Court and
the Tax Commission. (R. at 16934706).

1?

11 l

n M u c h ' ' i ) " | , ih" I \\ i iiiiiinission drtiiol Mlijini's 11id Ihr Board's Joint

Motioi 1 for Approval of Settlement. (R. at 2871). The Tax Commission ruled that
Granite was an intervenor

having filed its Motion to Intervene on November 1 . .. u »<) -

and therefore, was required to give consei it to tl le Settlem ^nt \gi eement Bee .-<i c
< iranilt' did nol ;!i\i' if1- nvs'Mit Ihe Tax Commission declined to enforce or approve the
Settlement Agreement. (R. at 181.7-18) The Tax Commission, ^owevci did n-^ address
any other potential deficiencies w \l\i IIK Settlement Agreement.
..;-•!-:..

!

. .

• * t.-Mission's determination on t

this issue, it is not necessary for the Commission to decide any of the other issues briefed
;md argued by the parties", including claims that the Settlement Agreement was i lie"LM!
violated public polic> ai id exceede I tl le Bi

•

>

Because of its refusal to enforce the Settlement Agreement, the Tax Commission
held a Formal Hearing on April 23 through April 27. 200] to determine the fair market
value iv>r ihe property in quesliMii lm ihr \CJJ.S, !*>*> ' Ihnmjjli l11'"1^1 I'lir l"i\ i 'ominKsmn
deternlined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was $215,210,000,
$212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively. (R at
2422)

;,.,, a c t i o n was outl: • .

—. **.rr

Deeisic m (R ; it 24 22-40).
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•>

V-.-IIH1^

'• Two days later, on Sep ten lbei 20, 200 T , tl le " I ax Coi irt issi led a memorandi n n
decisioi t whereii i it disapp t o vt d tl le Settlement Agreement. (R. at 1962-87). The Tax
Court reasoned that, since jurisdiction was split between the Tax Commission (19971999 Valuation Case) and the Tax < .'Ui:-, , ; 1 "
an" :
th e r e

•
w a s n o way

' • •' '

'•'

»n . u; ..JAL . I* ,^c-

!.'• -:J,..'

-ir-\^

1

Hie vanou& lax \ i,irs,

f0I t j i e y a x c o u r t t 0 enforce the Settlement Agreement in its entirety
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at 2638). Thus, the Tax Court concluded that it could now enforce the Settlement
Agreement as a reflection of the parties' attempts to "effectuate a settlement agiecu a*;."

Although this Motion was filed in late 2000, briefed in early 2001 and argued m March
2001. The Tax Court did not issue its ruling until some six months later. The Tax Court
was apparently not aware at the time of its Memorandum Decision of the Tax
Commission's Final Decision.
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to do so, the Tax Court exceeded its jurisdiction and improperly enforced the Settlement
Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE.
By way of the Settlement Agreement, the Board and Alliant attempted to "settle"

disputes over Alliant's tax obligations for the years 1995 through 1999. The Tax Court,
although initially refusing to enforce the Settlement Agreement, ultimately upheld the
Settlement Agreement as enforceable. The Tax Court erred when it did so because the
Settlement Agreement (1) fails because an express and material condition precedent,
namely approval by the Tax Commission, did not occur; (2) fails to tax Alliant with
uniformity and equality; (3) is void for failure of consideration; (4) exceeds the Board's
constitutional and statutory authority; and (5) violates public policy.
a. Because The Utah Tax Commission Rejected The Settlement Agreement,
An Express Condition Precedent Failed And The Settlement Agreement Is
Unenforceable.
Long standings principles of contract law establish that failure of a condition
precedent relieves an obligor of any duty to perform. Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council,
Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999). A condition precedent is one that must be
performed before a party is obligated to perform. See generally, Welch Transfer and
Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983). This Court succinctly stated this
rule when it held that "[w]here fulfillment of a contract is made to depend upon the act or
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consent of a third person over whom neither party has any control, the contract cannot
be enforced unless the act is performed or the consent given." Id.
In this matter, the Settlement Agreement expressly states that "[t]his settlement
proposal is subject to . •. final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission." (R. at
1690-91). (emphasis added). Thus, the Tax Commission's approval was a condition
precedent to its enforcement. Without that approval, the Settlement Agreement expressly
is not enforceable.
The parties to the Settlement Agreement understood this. Thus, they prepared the
Stipulation and Motion to Approve the Settlement Agreement for the Tax Commission.
In addition, Tax Commission approval was more than a mere formality. The parties
recognized that such a large refund would likely require tax levies in order to recoup
necessary tax funds. As such, the Settlement Agreement specifically required "final
approval by the Utah State Tax Commission . .. and entry of appropriate judgments and
orders sufficient to authorize Salt Lake County and the affected taxing entities within Salt
Lake County to recover all refunds paid through the imposition of an appropriate
judgment levy." (R. at 1690-91). The Tax Commission's approval was needed in order
for the judgment levy to be authorized. See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-913.
Moreover, the parties recognized and understood that this approval was not a
given. In fact, the parties set forth terms in case the Tax Commission rejected the
Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement stated that "in the event the
settlement is not accepted, none of the communications nor correspondence relating to
the settlement shall be introduced or produced by any party not shall they be deemed

17

admissible including by reference or inclusion in the pleadings of the parties in any
proceeding relating to the matters in dispute .. .." (R. at 1691).
As the parties contemplated, on March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission rejected the
Settlement Agreement, stating "[t]he Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement is denied."
(R. at 1817). Accordingly, an express condition precedent to the Settlement Agreement
failed. When such a condition fails, the "contract cannot be enforced." The Settlement
Agreement therefore is unenforceable, and the Tax Court erred in holding otherwise.
The Tax Court even recognized, at least initially, that the law so mandated this
outcome. As the Tax Court noted in its September 20, 2001 Order denying the Joint
Motion to Approve Settlement, "even though this Court disagrees with the legal theory
relied upon by the Utah State Tax Commission, the Court has no option but to
reluctantly disapprove of the Settlement Agreement.... The rejection decision of
the Utah State Tax Commission forces this Court to reject a Settlement Agreement
which it believes is valid and legally sustainable." (R. at 1963). (emphasis added). The
Tax Court clearly recognized that it could not approve an agreement where a condition
precedent failed. (Id.)
This led the Tax Court itself to not approve the Settlement Agreement. That
decision also constituted a failure of a condition precedent, as the Tax Court's approval
was also required. Nevertheless, once the Tax Commission had rendered a final decision
on the merits and Alliant appealed to the Tax Court, the Tax Court forced its will upon
the parties and the Tax Commission and approved the Settlement Agreement. However,
approval by the Tax Court on appeal is not approval of the Tax Commission. Regardless
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of the Tax Court's actions, the Tax Commission rejected the agreement and a condition
precedent failed. Therefore, the Tax Court's decision enforcing the Settlement
Agreement should be overturned.
b. The Settlement Violates Constitutional And Statutory Mandates That All
Property Be Assessed And Taxed Uniformly And Equally, At Its Fair
Market Value.
The Settlement Agreement violates both Utah constitutional and statutory law
because it fails to impose taxes at a uniform and equal rate. Sections 2 and 3 of article
XIII of the Utah Constitution demand that all property be taxed at a uniform and equal
rate. Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution states that "[a]ll tangible property in
the state . .. shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law." Section 3 provides that
[t]he Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the state, according to
its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person
and corporation shall pay tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its
tangible property....
The Utah Legislature, as required by the Constitution, also mandated that "[a]ll tangible
taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its
fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-103.
The underlying objective of these sections "is to insure that all taxable property
should bear its just proportion of the burdens of taxation." Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1990). To achieve that objective "the
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market or cash value of all property must be ascertained and used as the common
denominator for all assessments." Id. As this Court explained,
It is evident that the term "according to its value in money" [article XIII,
section 3] means that all property shall be valued, for the purposes of
assessment, as near as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in
other words, that the valuation of assessment and taxation shall be, as near
as reasonably practicable, equal to the cash price for which the property
valued would sell in the open market, for this is doubtless the correct test of
the value of property.
Id. at 1159-60 (citations omitted).
Thus, Utah law demands that all entities pay taxes in proportion to their property's
assessed, full market value. Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103, 115
(Utah 1997). Absent assessment and payment based upon market value, taxpayers may
be given disparate treatment. For example, "some properties could be assessed below full
market value, and if taxes could be calculated on that basis, the owners of the properties
could avoid accountability for their share of governmental expenses, and the goal of
uniformity and equality would be defeated." Id. The Constitution and state law
expressly prohibit such conduct.
In this matter, the Settlement Agreement actually demands disparate treatment and
subverts uniformity and equality, both in violation of the Utah Constitution and statutory
law. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement fails to place a value or assessment on
Alliant's property. It completely ignores the property's market value. Rather, the
Settlement Agreement states that "[n]o obsolescence percentage or amount will be
applied to any particular year under appeal and any allocation of a reduction in value to
any particular year shall be for refund calculation percentages only and shall be neither
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indicative nor dispositive with respect to any issue raised in Alliant's appeals." (R. at
1691). In other words, the Settlement Agreement is not based upon a fair market value or
an "equalization" of assessments for the five years at issue. It is based solely on a lump
sum tax dollar refund.
The lump sum refund, as outlined in the Settlement Agreement, meant that
Alliant's taxes for the years 1995 through 1999 were not determined by market value.
This is further evidenced by the Tax Commission's findings, following the April 23-27,
2001 Formal Hearing. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for the
Alliant property was $215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997
through 1999 respectively. It is undisputed that if the $5 million Settlement Agreement
refund was allocated to the various tax years in dispute, and converted to represent values
for the subject property, that such values would be substantially lower than the fair
market value determined by the Tax Commission.
In sum, the $5 million dollar tax refund is not based upon fair market value and
actually contravenes the fair market value determined by the Tax Commission. Thus, by
its very terms and the subsequent finding of the Tax Commission, the Settlement
Agreement violates the Utah Constitution since it does not impose taxes based upon fair
market value. Accordingly, this Court should find that the Tax Court erred when it
enforced the Settlement Agreement
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c. The Consideration For The Settlement Agreement Failed When The
County Was Forced To Try This Matter Before The Utah Tax
Commission.
It is well established that failure of consideration "exists wherever one who has
either given or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to receive in
some material respect the agreed exchange for that performance." Aquagen Intern, Inc.
v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1998). More importantly, "[i]f a failure of
consideration occurs, the contract ceases to exist." Id. (emphasis added).
In this matter, the consideration the Board received for entering the Settlement
Agreement was two fold: (1) avoidance of continued cost of litigation; and (2) avoidance
of the risk of trial, i.e., an unfavorable decision. (R. at 1683). Evidence of this
consideration can be found in the statements of County Commissioners Mark Shurtleff
and Brent Overson. For example, Commissioner Shurtleff, just minutes before voting to
approve the Settlement Agreement, stated that "[h]e felt [that it] would be inappropriately
unreasonable and risky to continue litigation" between the County and Alliant. (R. at
1684). Commissioner Shurtleff further stated that "[b]y settling this case, the
Commission will be resolving a five-year dispute and avoid having to pay an $11 million
settlement later." (R. at 1684). Commissioner Overson echoed those same concerns,
arguing that the County would likely lose and therefore settlement was preferred. (R. at
1683).
Despite the Commissioners' incorrect assumptions regarding the strength of their
case and risk of the Board losing in front of the Tax Commission, the avoidance of
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litigation and a possible large refund were what they were bargaining for by way of the
Settlement Agreement. The Board lost this bargain, by no fault of its own, when Granite
School District intervened in the Tax Commission matter, thereby causing the Tax
Commission to reject the Settlement Agreement. Because the Settlement Agreement was
not immediately enforced, the County was forced to incur the expense of litigation and a
trial and was exposed to the risk of an unfavorable verdict. In other words, the Board lost
the benefit of its bargain.
In short, when the Board was forced to trial before the Tax Commission, it failed
to receive the agreed exchange for its performance under the Settlement Agreement. The
consideration failed. Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement ceased to exist and should
not have been enforced.
d. The Settlement Agreement Exceeds The Board's Authority.
County Boards of Equalization are established by Article XIII, Section 7 of
Utah's Constitution. The relevant provision provides:
(1) In each county, there shall be a county board of
equalization consisting of elected county officials as provided
by statute.
(2) Each county board of equalization shall adjust and
equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal
property within its county, subject to the State Tax
Commission's regulation and control as provided by law.
(3) The county boards of equalization shall have other
powers as may be provided by statute.
(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax
Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by
statute authorize any court established under Article VIII to
adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter
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decided by a county board of equalization relating to revenue
and taxation.
Utah Const. Art. XIII, Sec 7. Under this provision, the Board is only authorized to
"adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment" of property unless other powers have
been granted to the Board by the Tax Commission or the legislature.
The Board has not been granted any powers to simply remit or reduce taxes in
bulk, lump sums. In fact, the relevant statutes provide that the Board is to "adjust and
equalize the valuation and assessment of real and personal property." Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-1001. The County Board may also "increase or decrease any assessment contained
in any assessment book, so as to equalize the assessment of ^all classes of property under
Section 59-2-103." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1003. When a taxpayer appeals the
valuation of his property to the Board, the Board's decision must "contain a
determination of the valuation of the property based on fair market value, and a
conclusion that the fair market value is properly equalized with the assessed value of
comparable properties." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(3)(b).
Thus, Utah law clearly limits the Board's authority to "settle" tax disputes to
adjusting assessments to reflect fair market value. The proposed Settlement Agreement
does not do this but simply reduces Alliant's taxes, over several years in one bulk, lump
sum. The Settlement Agreement therefore exceeds the Board's authority and should be
rejected. See, e.g., State v. KimmelU 154 N.E. 97, 99 (111. 1926) (noting "tax officers or
boards of county commissioners, or the like, have no power to compromise a tax, or to
release it wholly or in part, unless specifically authorized to do so by statute").
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While the Board may increase or decrease an assessment, such adjustment must be
done to equalize the assessment, and thus the tax burden. Inherent in equalizing the
assessment of property is a determination of the property's market value. See section
1(b), supra, (discussing constitutional requirement that property be taxed uniformly and
equally based upon market value). In other words, the Boards' decision to adjust must be
premised upon a determination of the valuation of the property based on fair market
value, and a conclusion that the fair market value is properly equalized with the assessed
value of comparable properties. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1004(3)(b).
In this matter, the Settlement Agreement contains no such determination. No
market value is stated. The Settlement Agreement is devoid of any reference to fair
market value assessments. It is impossible to determine whether the settlement is
premised on functional obsolescence, economic obsolescence, land values or the taxation
of property Alliant claims is exempt from taxation. Thus, the Board unlawfully resolved
litigation without regard to its constitutional and statutory mandates that all property be
taxed and assessed at fair market value.
The Tax Commission recognized these failures as well. As Tax Commissioner
Bruce Johnson set forth in his concurrence,
[ujnfortunately, at this point in time, there is still no allocation . . . Without such
an allocation, however, we have no way of evaluating the merits of the proposed
settlement. . . Where there is no such allocation, this Commission cannot know
what it is approving in terms of market value or even how much of the settlement
is still within its jurisdiction.
(R. at 1813-14). (emphasis added).
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In addition to the powers to equalize and adjust market values, the Board, "upon
sufficient evidence being produced that property has been either erroneously or illegally
assessed," may order the erroneously or illegally assessed taxes to be refunded or
deducted. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321. There is no evidence in this matter that
Alliant's property was erroneously or illegally assessed by five million dollars. In fact,
the evidence is to the contrary - that Alliant's property was appropriately assessed. See,
supra, Section 1(a) (noting that allocation of five million dollar refund to tax years in
question, converted to values for subject property, would be substantially lower than
those determined by the Tax Commission). Failing to make such a finding, the Board
lacked authority to refund taxes as it did pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
In short, the Board had authority to adjust valuations and assessments, and even
refund taxes, but such adjustments and refunds still needed to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements that taxes are paid proportionally based upon
the property's market value. The Settlement Agreement does not comply with this
constitutional and statutory mandate. Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement exceeds
the Board's statutory authority. As such, this Court should find that the Tax Court erred
in enforcing the Settlement Agreement.
e. The Settlement Agreement is Illegal and Against Public Policy and
Therefore Unenforceable.
This Court has long recognized the "well-settled rule that courts will not lend their
aid, and enforce contracts which are illegal, or the performance of which is against public
policy." Overholt v. Burbidge, 28 Utah 408, 79 P. 561 (Utah 1905). Notwithstanding
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this rule, the Tax Court enforced the Settlement Agreement, which by its very terms is
illegal and violates public policy.
First, as previously noted, the Settlement Agreement violates the Utah
Constitutional because it fails to impose taxes at a uniform and equal rate. See, supra,
Section 1(b); Utah Const., Art. XIII, §§ 2, 3 (demanding that all property be taxed at a
uniform and equal rate).
Second, Utah statues mandate that "[a]ll tangible taxable property shall be
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103.
Third, Utah public policy demands that all entities pay taxes in proportion to their
property's assessed, full market value. Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d
103, 115 (Utah 1997). Absent assessment and payment based upon market value,
taxpayers may be given disparate treatment. Public policy expressly prohibits such
conduct. Yet that is exactly what the Settlement Agreement requires.
In sum, the Settlement Agreement is illegal and against public policy because it
allows Alliant to be taxed at less than its property's fair market value. Because the
Settlement Agreement is illegal and against public policy, the Tax Court erred by
enforcing it.
IL

THE TAX COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT IT WAS NOT
BOUND BY THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION WHERE GRANITE
WAS A RECOGNIZED THIRD PARTY INTERVENOR.
In reaching its decision to enforce the Settlement Agreement, the Tax Court erred

when it ignored Granite's position as a third party intervenor. Specifically, the Tax Court
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held that "[i]f the motion [to intervene] did not precede the [Settlement Agreement], then
this Court cannot give any weight to a potential filing of a potential intervenor who
potentially might become a future party to the action." (R. at 1974). The Tax Court then
confirmed that it "disagree[d] with the legal theory relied upon by the Utah State Tax
Commission" and determined that the Tax Commission incorrectly rejected the
Settlement Agreement. (R. at 1963). The Tax Court's decision was erroneous for several
reasons.
First, this Court holds that "[t]he settlement of a controversy by the parties before
a motion to intervene as of right has been adjudicated does not constitute a final
settlement and does not render moot either the motion or an appeal from a denial of that
motion." Millard County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991)
(emphasis added). In Millard County, the county sought to intervene in a proceeding
before the Tax Commission5 to redetermine the sales tax liability of Intermountain Power
Agency ("IPA"). Shortly after Millard County filed its motion to intervene, the
Commission and IPA stipulated to the amount of IPA's tax liability. Six months later,
the Commission denied the County's motion to intervene. In reversing the Tax
Commission's decision to deny intervention, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We have previously held that counties have standing to challenge
determinations by the Commission which directly affect the county's
The standard for intervention in the Tax Commission is nearly identical to the standard
in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and provides that a party may intervene before the
Tax Commission if "the petitioner's legal interest may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding and the interest of justice and the orderly and prompt
conduct of the adjudicative proceeding will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(l) & (2).

OS

budgeting and taxing functions. It follows that Millard County has
standing to intervene based on its direct interest in the proceeds of the local
option sales tax that the Commission collected on the County's behalf.
M a t 461.
The Millard County Court then reasoned that "[t]o permit the settlement of a
controversy by stipulation to moot an extant motion to intervene under a statute . .. could
destroy the legal right on which the motion to intervene is based and, in this case, allow
procedural strategies to defeat the statutory policy allowing for intervention." Id. Thus,
this Court held that the settlement was not final.
Similarly, in this matter, Granite had a right to intervene in the cases pending
before the Tax Commission and the Tax Court. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a); Utah
Code Ann. §63-46(b)-9(2)(a). This right stemmed from Granite's role as a taxing entity.
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(32) (setting forth school districts as taxing entities); Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of the State of Utah Tax Comm'n, 979 P.2d 346
(Utah 1999) ("The fact that Kennecott involved county governments does not create any
distinction justifying a different treatment for municipalities and school districts with
respect to standing to sue. All taxing entities possess interests and responsibilities of a
similar nature if not always the same scope."); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, 702 P.2d 451, 454-55 (Utah 1985) (finding taxing entities such as Granite have
standing to challenge Tax Commission determinations that may affect the taxing entities
budgeting and taxing functions); Millard County, 823 P.2d at 461 (Utah 1991).
As an intervenor of right, Granite filed its Motion to Intervene with the Tax
Commission on November 17, 2000, some two weeks before the Settlement Agreement
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was reached. Therefore, the Settlement Agreement "does not constitute a final
settlement," but rather required the approval of Granite as a third party. This approval
was not given. Therefore, the Tax Commission was correct in denying the Settlement
Agreement.
Second, the reasoning of the Tax Court is without basis and ignores the factual and
legal standing of the parties and dispute. Essentially, the Tax Court argues that Granite
did not have standing to contest or reject the Settlement Agreement because "a motioned
intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to intervene has been
filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon." (R. at 1975). The Tax Court takes this to
mean that only a recognized party may object to a settlement agreement. As shown
above, this theory was clearly rejected by this Court in the Millard County case. A
motioned intervenor of right may contest the settlement agreement. Thus, when Granite
intervened in the Tax Court on December 7, 2000, and with the Tax Commission on
November 17, 2000, Granite had the right to contest and object to any settlement.
But even if the Tax Court was correct, Granite was a party in the Tax Case as of
February 14, 2001, and a party to the Tax Commission as of January 29, 2001, well
before either adjudicative body ruled on the validity of the Settlement Agreement. As
such, the Tax Commission duly recognized Granite as a necessary party to any settlement
that would dispose of the case in its entirety and correctly determined that any final
judgment needed Granite's consent. The Tax Court rejected this theory, even though it
did not determine the viability of the Settlement Agreement until a full nine months after
Granite filed its motion to intervene and seven months after Granite's motion was
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granted. Thus, by the time the Settlement Agreement was ruled upon, Granite was a
party and the case could not be disposed of, in its entirety, absent Granite's consent and
approval. The Tax Court enforced the Settlement Agreement regardless of Granite's
status as a party and the Tax Commission's well-reasoned opinion that Granite's
intervention prevented a final settlement. To do so was in error.
III.

THE TAX COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO OVERTURN
THE TAX COMMISSION'S REJECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.
The Tax Court was limited in what actions it could take following the Tax

Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement. Utah statutes provide that the Tax
Court "may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the commission." Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-604. However, where jurisdiction rests with the Tax Commission, the
Tax Court should "reverse and remand the matter to the [Tax] Commission for a proper
determination pursuant to correct legal standards" rather than simply substitute its own
judgment for that of the Tax Commission. Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702
P.2d 451, 457 (Utah 1985).
This rule is especially applicable in this instance. First, the Settlement Agreement
expressly mandated that the Tax Commission give its approval. Thus, the Tax Court
could simply not replace its judgment for that of the Tax Commission's. If the Tax Court
was convinced that the Tax Commission improperly rejected the Settlement Agreement
based upon Granite's status as a necessary party, then the Tax Court should have
remanded the case back to the Tax Commission.
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This is particularly true where the totality of the Tax Commission's rationale for
denying the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement was not presented to the parties or
the Tax Court. In fact, the Tax Commission explicitly stated that "[bjecause of the
Commission's determination [on intervenor status of Granite] it is not necessary for the
Commission to decide any of the other issues briefed and argued by the parties." (R. at
1817). These other issues included the constitutionality and legality of the Settlement
Agreement, as well as the Tax Commission's authority to approve it.
Tax Commissioner Johnson explained the rationale for not deciding these
remaining issues, stating that "[t]here is much to be said for the concept that a court
should only decide the specific case before it and should base that decision on the
narrowest possible grounds. Judicial resources are not expended unnecessarily and
carefully tailored decisions result." (R. at 1816). Notwithstanding, Commissioner
Johnson indicated that the Tax Commission saw real problems with the Settlement
Agreement's failure to allocate the refund to the tax years in question and the resulting
inability to base the refund on market value. (R. at 1813-15).
In sum, the Tax Court erred when it failed to remand the matter back to the Tax
Commission for a full review of the enforceability where (1) the Tax Commission did not
give all reasons for its rejection of the Settlement Agreement; and (2) the Settlement
Agreement gave jurisdiction expressly to the Tax Commission to approve the agreement.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Tax Court's decision to enforce the Settlement
Agreement should be overturned.
DATED t h i s ^ day of April, 2004.

JonnE. S. Robson
David Pearce
^FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
Attorneys for Appellants
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

,rd

3 ru Dist. Civil No. 980901298
(1995-1996 valuation tax years)

Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.
****************************************

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION,

>rd

3 , a Dist. Civil No. 010908307
(1997-1999 valuation tax years)
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Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.

****************************************

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.
Plaintiff,
vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER
in his official capacity as SALT LAKE
COUNTYASSESSOR; LARRY
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER;
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY
HORIUCHL and BRENT OVERSON, in
their official capacities as the SALT LAKE
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,

<th

4l" Dist. Civil No. 990402607
(Independent Action)

Defendants.
vs.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Honorable Lynn W. Davis

Intervenors
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On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant"), and Defendants
Salt Lake County, its officers and assessors, entered into a written stipulation in settlement of the
above-captioned matter. The Salt Lake County Commission approved the Settlement Agreement
on December 6, 2000, and on December 15, 2000 parties to the Settlement Agreement filed a
Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving
Settlement ("Joint Motion") with this Court.
The parties in the above-captioned matter, including Defendants-Intervenors Lee
Gardner, Utah State Tax Commission, and Granite School District (collectively "Defendants")
subsequently filed their respective memoranda stating their positions on the Joint Motion. On
March 13, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on the Joint Motion.
Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the respective parties, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision"
("Decision") dated September 20, 2001 with respect to the Joint Motion.
On June 7, 2002, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it considered:
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its Decision
That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement;
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement;
3. Alliant5 s Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and consideration of
Plaintiffs [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and
u 0 £ o iH

4. The Award of Attorneys' Fees.
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint

Motion for Approval of Settlement.
2.

The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through April 27,

2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through
1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was
$215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively.
3.

On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third

District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 of the Tax
Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsystems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County, et al„ Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the
County's assessments of Alliant's real property for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "19971999 Valuation Case"). Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as
a Tax Court Judge.
4.

Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry

dated October 9, 2001.
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5.

The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian,

sitting as a Tax Court Judge.
6.

Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case

was AUiant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated
"Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts.
7.

AUiant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court.

No less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending
before the Court. The first of the six pending AUiant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed
February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick (980901298). This first
case was termed the "Independent or NIROP Action/' and involves Allianf s statutory and
constitutional challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that AUiant operates
under the direction and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve
Ordnance Plant or "NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999 and future years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the County for having taxed AUiant in violation of Article VI of the United States
Constitution.
8.

There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP

Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis.
9.

The other five pending AUiant v. Salt Lake County, et aL cases are appeals that

either Salt Lake County or AUiant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax Commission
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("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's
1995 and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case").
The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996
Valuation Case respectively to Judges Nehring (990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis
(00901301), Medley (000901449 AA), and Memmott 00070001). Again with agreement from
all parties, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable
Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned 'Tax Court Judge" for the Independent or NIROP
Action.
10.

By Order dated on November 6, 2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 1997-

1999 Valuation Case to this Court.
11.

On December 5, 2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant

entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000,
the Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly elected legislative body, adopted and
approved the Settlement Agreement.
12.

On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary

Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive.
13.

As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are

all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property

tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action,
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax
matters have been dismissed.
14.

Parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement while some

matters covered by the Settlement Agreement, specifically property tax disputes involving
Alliant and some of the Defendants, were pending before this Tax Court and the Tax
Commission. Decision at 12.
15.

The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the Tax

Commission and this Court. Decision at 13.
16.

Prior to the formalization and approval of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or

proposal was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as parties to
the action. While the Settlement Agreement deletes the word "Assessors," as approved and
executed, it states that Salt Lake County, and its "officers" are parties to the Settlement
Agreement. Decision at 15.
17.

The executed Settlement Agreement bears the signature of Karl Hendrickson,

Deputy District Attorney for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, and
the signature of Maxwell Miller for and on behalf of Alliant. The Settlement Agreement was an
offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties to the Settlement Agreement.
Decision at 15.
18.

Defendant Lee Gardner, as the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor, is an

officer of Salt Lake County and a nominal party to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 15.
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19.

The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in extending and

agreeing to the Settlement Agreement were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County
Commission. Decision at 15.
20.

In reaching settlement, consideration was given to the risk of liability to Salt Lake

County and taxing entities within Salt Lake County, together with the costs and trouble of
protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion relative
to the merits of the respective claims. Decision at 16.
21.

The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Salt Lake County, which later

attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language based upon statutory, constitutional
and pragmatic arguments. Decision at 16.
22.

There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties

to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 16.
23.

There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the

agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage,
injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy. Decision at 16.
24.

This Settlement Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board

of Equalization and then was adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission.

25.

The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon

fair market value. Decision at 17.

26.

The Settlement Agreement does not address the divisibility/severability of the $5

million dollar settlement amount to separate years. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple
tax years and multiple jurisdictions. Decision at 17.
27.

The Settlement Agreement binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys,"

who, "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" shall "seek to secure an appropriate order
from the Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner." Decision at 22.
28.

The Settlement Agreement further provides that "In the event any party breaches

the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or
costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement." Decision at 22.
29.

The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization did not affirmatively seek to secure

approval of the Settlement Agreement, nor did it object to approval of the Settlement Agreement;
instead it acted in "benign neutrality" with respect to the approval process. Decision at 23.
30.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his role of Salt Lake County Assessor, advocated the

defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invited the Court to void the agreement on a variety of
statutory, factual and constitutional grounds, which the Court rejects. Decision at 23.
31.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is a party

to the Settlement Agreement because he is, at least nominally, an "officer" of Salt Lake County.
Decision at 23.
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32.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, breached

the Settlement Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather than seeking to
secure its approval. Decision at 23.
33.

Other Defendants who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement are not bound

by the attorneys' fee provision of the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 23.
34.

While the Settlement Agreement is a blanket settlement for all property tax

disputes between the parties for 1995 through 1999 either pending before this Court or before the
Tax Commission, the Settlement Agreement did not address future valuations. Decision at 23.
35.

The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's

assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or
NIROP actions seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the
years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years.

In addition, the Complaint also requests

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article
VI of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years
1995-1999, clearly including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover
future years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued
unlawful assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of the NEROP claims are expressly covered
by the Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never
addressed in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement
NIROP claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related valuation cases.
** «~ > ^
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36.

The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good faith and

anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant. Decision at 24.
37.

The intent of the parties to settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995

through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal. Decision at 24.
38.

The Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement did not focus on

constitutional difficulties and problematic implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but
primarily upon the Settlement Agreement's failure to include a potential intervenor. Decision at
13.
39.

The Tax Commission's factual basis for rejecting the Settlement Agreement does

not exist here because an intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to
intervene has been filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. Decision at 13. Defendant
Granite School District filed its Motion to Intervene on December 7, 2000, whereas the Salt Lake
County Commission ratified the Settlement Agreement on December 6, 2000.
40.

Alliant's request for attorneys' fees is reasonable and appropriate in the amount of

$30,000.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now therefore enters its

^
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Settlement Agreement is enforceable, legal and constitutional. Decision at

2.

The Court rejects Defendants' constitutional challenges to the Settlement

21.

Agreement, specifically including Defendants' arguments that the Settlement Agreement is
unconstitutional because it does not assign an assessed value to the property at issue based upon
fair market value. Decision at 21.
3.

The Court rejects the Tax Commission's objection to the Settlement Agreement

that the Tax Commission and/or Granite School District are necessary parties to the Settlement
Agreement. Granite School District was not a necessary party to the Settlement Agreement and
its absence as a party to the agreement does not make the Settlement Agreement unenforceable.
Decision at 24.
4.

When the Court issued its Decision, jurisdiction to approve the Settlement

Agreement was divided between this Court and the Tax Commission. This Court had partial
jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement in that jurisdiction was then shared between
this Court and the Tax Commission. Decision at 22.
5.

While jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement was divisible between the

Tax Commission and the Court, the refund award to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years. Decision at 22.
6.

The refund amount of $5 million to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is

indivisible and non-allocable between the various tax years. Decision at 25.
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7.

The sole reason the Court initially declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement

is that the Court's jurisdiction and the Tax Commission's jurisdiction over the years 1995
through 1999 at issue under the Settlement Agreement were divisible. Decision at 25.
8.

The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and has authority to

resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. Decision at 16.
9.

Alliant is entitled to attorneys' fees to be assessed against Defendant Lee Gardner,

in his official capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, because Mr. Gardner breached the
Settlement Agreement in not seeking to secure approval of the Settlement Agreement. Decision
at 24 and 25.
10.

The Court has entertained, considered and rejected Defendants' arguments against

the Settlement Agreement and its enforcement, which include:
10.1

At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the
opportunity to fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property
uniformly and equally based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-302 and
Utah Code Ami. § 59-2-102, as amended;

10.2

The Settlement Agreement address but does not set or fix values
based upon fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value
violates Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102
and Utah Const. Art. XIII, sec. 2.

10.3

Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its

Uu
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face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive
because the "conditional language" of the agreement is plain and
clear;
10.4

The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the
Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible.

The

Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with
differing jurisdictions;
10.5

There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the
$5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years; allocation
would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and further, if the
tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare;

10.6

The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple
jurisdictions;

10.7

The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the
Settlement Agreement;

10.8

The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement
Agreement is that the terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust
and the Agreement entirely ignores unifomi and equal taxation
statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally
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flawed because there is no attempt to achieve fair market value.
Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be achieved.
10.9

The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases.

10.10

The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement
Agreement.

10.11

Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to
reject the Settlement Agreement.

10.12

The Settlement Agreement cannot be implemented in its current
form because it fails to reflect fair market value assessments.

Decision at 17-18.
11.

This Court is not bound by the Tax Commission's decision of rejection of the

Settlement Agreement. Decision at 13.
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters its
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ORDER
Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend is hereby granted and the Court enforces the Settlement
Agreement in its entirety. Judgment is hereby entered against Salt Lake County and in favor of
Alliant for $5 million. The Court awards attorneys' fees to Alliant Techsystems, Inc., against
Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, in the amount of $30,000.
DATED this J^£_ day of June 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this J 2 _ day of June, 2003,1 caused to be sent, via U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER ON JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT, to:

J. Craig Smith
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC
60 East South Temple, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Kelly W.Wright
P.O. Box 886
Morgan, UT 84050
John E. S. Robson
David Pearce
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210
Mary Ellen Sloan
2001 South State St., S 3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Bill Thomas Peters
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters
185 South State St., Ste. 700
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111

Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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Fourtfr Judical District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMA B j p T H , Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 990402607
DATE: JUNE 3,2002
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN,
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,

CLERK: SGJ

Defendants,
vs.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.

This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on January 29, 2002. The parties
were present and represented as follows:
Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

Maxwell Miller, Esq.
Randy Grimshaw, Esq.
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Salt Lake County Assessor
Utah State Tax Commission

Kelly Wright, Esq.
Michelle Bush, Esq.

Salt Lake County & Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization

Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.

Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization

Craig Smith, Esq.
Brett Rich, Esq.

Granite School District, Intervenor

David Pearce, Esq.

Arguments were entertained and the matter was taken under advisement. Counsel were
advised that the written decision would be delayed because the issues are complex and unique, the
briefing is extensive, and the Court does not have the benefit of a law clerk. In addition, the
Court is handling over a hundred cases in the Municipal Division assignment on many days and
occasionally two hundred to three hundred cases per day. Attempting to find contemplative time
to consider the profound arguments of counsel in a case of this importance and magnitude is
mind-boggling.
The various motions will be treated separately because some have unique facts and
procedure. It is important also to note that the date stamping of motions, memoranda, responses
and replies is a bit tricky because in many instances faxed copies were entered, and upon arrival
originals were again entered by a clerk of the court. In addition, some briefing addresses
overlapping and intertwining issues. The Court will treat the pending motions in the following
order:
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider
Its Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement;
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiff s Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement;
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3. Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and
consideration of Plaintiff s [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and
4. The Award of Attorneys' Fees.
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now
enters the following:

I.
MOTION
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S MOTION ASKING THE COURT TO
RECONSIDER ITS DECISION THAT THE ASSESSOR WAS A PARTY
TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A. Procedural History
1. On September 20, 2001, this Court issued its "Tax Court Decision," in which it held
the language of the Settlement Agreement, "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys" included
the County Assessor as a County officer and, therefore, a party.
2. Salt Lake County Assessor filed this motion and supporting memorandum on
October 29, 2001, requesting reconsideration of this portion of the decision.
3. Within the motion and memorandum, the Salt Lake County Assessor also objects to
an award of attorney fees. (This objection will be addressed separately under Section IV of this
opinion.)
4. Plaintiff responded by filing "Plaintiffs Response to (1) Defendants' Objections to
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement; and (2) Assessor's Memorandum for Reconsideration." (Response 1 will be addressed
in Section II of this opinion.)
-3-
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5. On December 21, 2001, the Utah State Tax Commission filed a Memorandum in
Reply to Alliant's Motion to Alter OR Amend Tax Court Decision and In Reply to Salt Lake
County Assessor's Motion to Reconsider. (The first part of the brief will be discussed in Section
III of this opinion.)
6. Alliant filed an opposing memorandum on October 31, 2001.
7. On January 17, 2002, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant") responded to
a. Tax Commission's Memorandum in Reply to Alliant's Motion to
Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision ("Tax Commission Memorandum");
b. Salt Lake County Assessor's Memorandum in Support of His Motion
to Amend OR Dismiss Alliant's First Claim for Relief ("Assessor
Memorandum");
c. Granite's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend
Tax Court Decision ("Granite Memorandum"); and
d. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's Memorandum Opposing
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision ("County
Memorandum"). Many of these responses will be addressed in other sections
of this opinion, but there are arguments intertwined dealing with the
Assessor's Motion to Reconsider.
8. On November 28, 2001, the Salt Lake County Assessor filed a "Notice to Submit for
Decision.

B. What Is This Court Reconsidering?
This Court, in its September 20, 2001, "Tax Court Decision," on pages 14-15, under
Sub-Section C (Is the Settlement Agreement Defeated by Salt Lake County Assessor's Claim that
He is Not a Party to the Settlement Agreement?), ruled as follows:
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Prior to the adoption of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or proposal
was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors." etc., as
the parties to the action. The "assessors" language was stricken out. The
Settlement Agreement which was agreed to indicates "Salt Lake County, its
officers," etc.
That agreement/letter, agreed to and adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake
County Commission bears the signature of Karl Hendriksen, Deputy District
Attorney. It was an offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the
parties. No one can contend that the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor
is not an officer of Salt Lake County. He is. He is a nominal party to the
Settlement Agreement.
This Court appreciates the unique duties and role of a county assessor.
A county assessor has statutory charges which frequently place him/her at
odds with the decisions of a board of equalization. The assessor necessarily
"checks" the decisions of the board and the assessor may appeal decisions of
the Board of Equalization on various grounds. Nonetheless, the Court finds
that the Salt Lake County Assessor, as an officer of Salt Lake County, is an
nominal party to the settlement agreement. The Salt Lake County
Commission has authority to legally bind the County and its officers.

C. County Assessor Legal Arguments
The Assessor specifically requests that this Court reconsider the above ruling and the
concomitant award of attorneys' fees against the Assessor. At earlier stages the Assessor did not
address the issue of attorneys' fees because of his constant and steadfast claim that he was not a
party to the Settlement Agreement. In making a Motion to Reconsider, the Assessor relies
generally upon the holding of Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P. 2d 650 (Utah 1994) citing
Bennion v. Hansen. 699 P. 2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), which state that "(I)t is settled law that a
trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment."
Since no final order or judgment has entered, the Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its
Decision is procedurally authorized.
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The County Assessor argues that he is an independently elected county official with
unique statutory and constitutional duties and that the County Commission had no authority to
bind the Assessor. Secondly, the Assessor argues that the Settlement was void as contrary to
public policy and constitutional and statutory mandates. Next, the Assessor argues that the
Settlement Agreement was an unlawful attempt to bind a future legislative body, and that the
Settlement Agreement violates the Utah Constitution and state statutes.
At oral argument, counsel argues that the Assessor cannot be bound by the Settlement
Agreement as a matter of contract law because there was no meeting of the minds, no bargain for
exchange and no offer and acceptance. The Salt Lake County Assessor was not privy to the offer
from Alliant to the Board of Equalization in November of 2000. Further, the counter offer made
in December 5, 2000, made by the Board of Equalization back to Alliant specifically struck
"assessors," but included Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys.
The Utah State Tax Commission argues that the Salt Lake County Assessor is an
independently elected official, independent from the Board of Equalization and with constitutional
and statutory duties to assess property both uniformly and at fair-market value. The State Tax
Commission submits that this Court ought to be wary of approving any procedure that allows
these duties and rights to be easily circumvented.
Alliant argues that the arguments made in the Motion to Reconsider simply rehash
those previously "made, debated, considered and rejected." Alliant further argues that a motion
to reconsider is not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that Utah Courts
have "consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration of a trial court's order or judgment." See Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields. 882 P. 2d
650, 653 n.4 (1994).
Further, Alliant reiterates arguments made previously that a county commission has
authority to bind the Assessor in property tax disputes, and that the Settlement Agreement is
supported by public policy. In addition, Alliant argues that the Settlement Agreement does not
-6-
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bind a future legislative body in performing a legislative function, but binds a government to
honor its contract and live up to its word. Alliant points out again that "breaching contracts made
in settlement of litigation is not a governmental function" and again challenges defendants "to find
a single case in American Jurisprudence holding that a government entity may breach a settlement
agreement of an unliquidated claim in the absence of fraud or overreaching."

D. Court's Discussion
If this Court reads Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P. 2d 650 (Utah 1994) correctly, a
court is free to entertain a motion for reconsideration at any point prior to entry of final order for
judgment. Here, as in Shepherd, no final order or judgment has entered. In the opinion of this
Court, here, as in Shepherd, the motion for reconsideration is, in essence, simply re-argument of
opposition to the previous motion.
This Court is acquainted with cases where a motion to reconsider has been brought
where a relied upon controlling case is no longer good law because of an intervening Supreme
Court decision. Likewise, a court may misstate something or prepare a ruling obvious to all
parties is in error. That is not the case here. The defendants again try to convince the Court that
the Assessor is not a county officer and again attempt to educate the Court as to the unique
constitutional and statutory duties of the assessor. The Court is profoundly aware of those duties.
While it does no harm to revisit these issues, it does no good either if already thoroughly briefed,
argued by counsel and thoroughly considered previously by this Court.

E. Decision on Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider
Its Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement
It is the opinion of this Court that a party bringing a motion to reconsider has the
burden to demonstrate that the Court ought to modify its decision prior to entry of an order or
judgment in light of an intervening appellate court decision, newly discovered pertinent facts not
-7-
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previously available, newly discovered case law which is on point and potentially dispositive,
because of obvious error, or other substantive reasons not tantamount to simple re-argument.
The Court has accepted the invitation to carefully reconsider and finds that the Assessor has failed
to meet this burden. Accordingly, Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion to Reconsider Its
Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement is hereby denied.
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II.
CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON JOINT MOTION
TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT
A. Procedural History
1. This Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" on September 20, 2001, with
respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Settlement.
2. On page 25 of the opinion, counsel for plaintiff was instructed to prepare Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order consistent with the decision.
3. Counsel for Alliant prepared the pleading and submitted it to the Court for signature
on or about October 1, 2001.
4. Granite filed an Objection to Alliant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on October 24, 2001.
Granite revised the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by
Alliant to correct the paragraphs to which Granite objects and to add those findings which were
omitted by Alliant. A copy of a red-lined version of Alliant's proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was attached. A copy of a final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
encompassing Granite's objections and proposed changes was also attached.
5. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization filed its Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and
Request for Hearing on October 25, 2001.
6. On October 29,2001, Salt Lake County Assessor filed its Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.
7. On November 2, 2001, Alliant filed its Reply to Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization's Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

-9-

uu

on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and Request for Hearing. This Reply addresses
attorneys' fees exclusively and will be considered morefollyin Section IV.
8. On November 2, 2001, Alliant filed a general/collective Response to Defendants'
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to
Approve Settlement.
9. Alliant filed a Notice to Submit Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order for Decision on November 2, 2001.
B. Succinct Statement of Defendant Objections
While a consideration of each objection is laborious and time consuming, attention to
detail in this case is imperative and fly-specking, unfortunately is merited.
1.

Granite School District
i.

Findings of Fact Objections
(1)

Substitute "shall" for "are committed" in paragraph 15.

(2) Paragraph 23 should be removed in its entirety,
ii.

Conclusions of Law
(1)

Granite objects to paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 because the Decision was not
limited in time to September 20,2001. The proposed Conclusions of
Law should eliminate any reference to the September 20, 2001 date.

(2)

Granite objects to paragraph 8. While the substance is accurate, it is
not supported by the cite.

(3)

Granite objects to paragraph 9 because it needs clarification. Granite
suggests substitution of the following language: "This Court is not
bound by the Tax Commission's reasoning in reaching its decision of
rejection of the Settlement Agreement because Granite was not an
intervenor in the action before this Court."
-10U UL U

iii.

Order
(1)

The proposed Order should eliminate any reference to the September
20,2001 date.

2.

Supplementation - Granite suggests that Alliant has ignored and omitted relevant
findings and proposes the inclusion of the following paragraphs:
"Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its
face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive
because the "conditional language" of the agreement [is] plain and
clear." Tax Court Decision at 17.
"The issue of divisibility /severability has not been addressed in
the Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The
Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with
differing jurisdictions." Id. Accordingly, this Court has no
authority or jurisdiction to approve the settlement for years 1997,
1998, and 1999." M a t 24.
"There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to
allocate the $5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years;
allocation would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and
further, if the tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment
nightmare." Id. at 17.
"The Agreement is fundamentally flawed because there is no
attempt to achieve fair market value. Uniformity, fairness and
equality cannot be achieved." Id.

3.

Salt Lake County Board of Equalization Objection
This objection does not suggest specific revisions and simply objects to the
award of any attorney fees and revisits argument why Assessor Gardner is not a
party to the Settlement Agreement. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization takes
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no further exception to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.
4.

Salt Lake County Assessor's Objections
i.

Findings of Fact
(1) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 3 because the italicized
language is misleading, factually inaccurate and beyond the
Court's decision.
(2) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 5 because of the pending
Motion to Reconsider.
(3) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 8 - same objection as
paragraph 5.
(4) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 11 because it is a conclusion of
law, not a finding of fact. In addition, the County Commission's
authority to settle tax disputes is limited. A
(5) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 13, but "valuations based upon
fair market value" is not addressed in the settlement.
(6)

Assessor takes exception to paragraph 17 which is inaccurate as to the
role of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.

(7)

Assessor takes exception to paragraph 19 as redundant and it should be
stricken.

(8) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 23 as inconsistent with the plain
language of the Settlement Agreement. It should be reconsidered by
the Court and deleted.
(9)

Assessor takes exception to paragraph 28 on various grounds.
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ii.

Conclusions of Law - Assessor Objections
(1)

Much of the language in paragraph 2 is not found in the Court's
decision.

(2)

The language of paragraph 3 is inconsistent with the Court decision on
page 24.

(3)

The "September 20,2001" language of paragraph 4, 5, 6 and 7 should
be eliminated and the language of paragraph 7 must be clarified.

(4)

Assessor objects to attorney fee provision in paragraph 8 for the
reasons stated in the Motion for Reconsideration.

iii.

Assessor's Objections to Order
Assessor objects to any award of attorney's fees and also adopts by
reference Granite's Objection to Alliant's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.

C. Alliant's Collective Response to Defendant Objections
In pages 4 -11 of its collective response, Alliant addresses each of the objections of
Granite and the Salt Lake County Assessor. Alliant does not respond specifically to the Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization because the Board does not suggest specific revisions and simply
re-argues its positions.

D. Court's Consideration of Objections by Defendants And Alliant's Response
A careful review of the objections and response suggests that the decision could have
been written with greater specificity. Some objections are well taken and proposed language is
more consistent with the decision.
If the Court is accurate, the defendants collectively take exception to the following:
Findings of Fact paragraphs 3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 15,17, 19, 23, 28;
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Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; and
Order in its entirety.

E. Ruling as to Defendants' Objections to Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law And Order
1. There being no objection, the Court approves paragraphs 1,2,4, 6, 7, 9, 10,12, 14,
16,18,20, 21, 22, 24,25,26, and 27 of the proposed Findings of Fact.
2. Paragraph 3 should be clarified stating that "a draft or proposal was circulated that
clearly indicated Salt Lake County, 'Assessors,' etc., as the parties to the action."
3. Paragraphs 5 and 8, 11,13,17 and 19 are approved over objection of Assessor.
4. Paragraph 15, substitute "shall" for "are committed to."
5. Paragraph 23'needs further clarification. Alliant is correct that it is drawn practically
verbatim from the Court's decision. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization refers to paragraph
23 as an "apparent oversight" in a collateral memorandum. Other defendants echo an identical
sentiment. It is not an "apparent oversight," but it is worthy of a revisit. Consider:
The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's
assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or
NIROP action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the
years 1995,1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests
relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI
of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 19951999, clearly including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover future
years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued unlawful
assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of NIROP claims are expressly covered by the
Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never addressed in
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the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement NIROP
claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related valuation cases.
6. The attorneys' fees provision contained in paragraph 28 will be addressed in Section
IV of this decision.
7. The Court approves paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law because there is no
objection.
8. Over objection of Assessor paragraph 2 is approved.
9. Paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact should be included as a Conclusion of Law and
paragraph 11 of the Findings should be substituted with the following: "This settlement
Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and then was
adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission."
10. References to September 20,2001 should be deleted in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7.
11. Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions is approved over objection of Assessor.
12. Paragraph 8 of the Conclusions is approved over objection with the addition of a
citation to page 24 of the decision.
13. Paragraph 9 of the Conclusions is approved over objection.
14. Granite argues that the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ignore
and omit relevant findings of the Tax Court. Granite's proposed findings are accurately drawn
from the opinion, but are simply this Court's attempt to articulate the defendants' arguments as
the Court understood them. If the parties wish, these paragraphs could be included as a laundry
list of arguments entertained and considered by the Court before reaching its decision.
15. The Order should eliminate any reference to the September 20, 2001 date.
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III.
ALLIANTS MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND TAX COURT DECISION AND
CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S [PROPOSED AND REVISED]
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON
JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT'
A. Procedural History
1. This Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" on September 20, 2001, with
respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.
2. Pursuant to the request of the Court, Alliant submitted Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on October 1, 2001.
3. Alliant submitted [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on November 13,2001.
4. Alliant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision together with a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on November 14,
2001.
5. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization filed a Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs
Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on December 21, 2001.
6. Granite filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend
Tax Court Decision, Objection to Proposed and Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on December 27, 2001.
7. The Utah State Tax Commission filed a Memorandum in Reply to Alliant's Motion
to Alter or Amend... on December 21, 2001.
8. The Salt Lake County Assessor filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision, Objection to Proposed and Revised Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on November 24, 2001.
9. Alliant filed Plaintiffs Response/Reply to: (1) Tax Commission's Memorandum in
Reply to Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision; (2) Salt Lake County
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Assessor's Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Amend or Dismiss Alliant's First Claim For
Relief; (3) Granite's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court
Decision; and (4) Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs
Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on January 15, 2002.

B. Statement of Facts
Granite agrees with Alliant's statement of facts 1-8, and 10-11 and disputes Alliant's
statement #9. Granite also proposes additional facts.
Assessor generally adopts Alliant's statements 1 - 4, 6 and 7, and acknowledges that
Alliant's Petition for Review and Complaint for the 1997 through 1999 property tax years has
been assigned to this Tax Court.
The Utah State Tax Commission submitted its own "background" facts but does not
specifically take exception to the Alliant's statement of facts. Likewise, Salt Lake County Board
of Equalization proposed abbreviated facts but did not take specific exception to the facts as
stated by Alliant. Upon review, the Court adopts the following statement of facts:
1. On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint
Motion for Approval of Settlement.
2. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through April 27,
2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through
1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was
$215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively.
3. On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third
Judicial District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 of the
Tax Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsvstems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County, et aL Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the
County's assessments of Alliant's real property for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "1997-17-

1999 Valuation Case"). Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as
a Tax Court Judge.
4. Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry dated
October 9, 2001.
5. The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian,
sitting as a Tax Court Judge.
6. Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case
was Alliant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated
"Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts.
7. Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court. No
less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending
before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed
February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick. This first case was
termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," and involves Alliant's statutory and constitutional
challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction
and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or
"NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and future
years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having
taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States Constitution.
8. There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP
Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis.
9. The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et aL cases are appeals that
either Salt Lake County or Alliant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax Commission
("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's 1995
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and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case"). The Clerk
of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996 Valuation
Case respectively to Judges Nehring, Hanson, Lewis, Medley and Memmott. Again with
agreement from all parties, the 1995-19996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to
the Honorable Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the
Independent or NIROP Action.
10. By Order dated on November 6,2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 19971999 Valuation Case to this Court.
11. On December 5,2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant
entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000, the
Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly constituted legislative body, adopted and
approved the Settlement Agreement.
12. On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary
Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive.
13. As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are
all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property
tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action,
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax
matters have been dismissed.
C. Discussion
This Court has already opined that the Settlement Agreement is "legal, enforceable and
constitutionally sanctioned." It is a blanket settlement between the parties and is a compromise
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and it was negotiated and entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to
Alliant
Because of jurisdictional developments since the time of the Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement, this Court now has exclusive jurisdiction over all pending tax disputes between Alliant
and defendants for the years 1995 to 1999 inclusive, specifically including the "NIROP" or
"independent action," the 1995-1996 Valuation Case and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. It is the
opinion of the Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case and
the 1997-1999 Valuation Case are now before this Court as an "original and independent
proceeding" for review by "trial de novo"
The Court has carefully considered defendants' arguments against the Motion to Amend
or Alter filed by Alliant. The Court believes that Alliant's Reply brief adequately addresses each
of those arguments. The Court so finds in order to achieve the clear intent of the parties to settle
the case. This Court declined to initially adopt the Joint Motion, but jurisdictional challenges have
evaporated. In addition, while this Court opined on the divisibility/indivisibility and nonallocatable tax year arguments of counsel, that issue does not become an insurmountable hurdle
for parties working together in good faith to effectuate a settlement agreement. The fact that the
Settlement Agreement was drafted and reviewed by seasoned and experienced tax attorneys on
both sides is noted by this Court.
Public policy favors enforcement of the Settlement Agreement; to refund $5 million to
Alliant. Exactly how that will take place is unknown, but the source of the funds is clearly
contractually provided; "either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of the
judgment Levy."
The Court has treated Alliant's Motion to Amend akin to a Motion to Reconsider in
light of the unique jurisdictional developments in this case and because no final order has entered
from the September 20th decision. This Court "may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order

-20* • r

** r\ n

of the commission, and shall grant relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in
accordance with its decision, as appropriate." Utah Code Ann. §59-1-604.

D. Decision
Allianfs Motion to Amend or Modify is hereby granted and the Court enforces the
Settlement Agreement in its entirety. This decision avoids weeks, if not months, of trial and
squarely places critical issues before Utah's Appellate Courts.
1. Is the Settlement Agreement entered into by and between Salt Lake County, its
officers and attorneys, and Alliant "legal, enforceable and constitutionally sanctioned?"
2. Is the reference to the approval by the State Tax Commission and the Tax Court a
condition precedent or simply a jurisdictional pre-requisite?
3. Even if it is condition precedent, can the Tax Court reverse or modify "any order of
the Commission" and approve the settlement if it has exclusive jurisdiction?
4. Does the "failure of consideration" argument defeat the Settlement Agreement even
if a party to the Settlement Agreement sought its defeat?
5. Is Allianfs Motion to Alter tantamount to a Motion to Reconsider in light of the
unique jurisdictional developments in this case and because no formal order has entered from the
September 20th decision?
6. If the Salt Lake County Assessor is an independently elected county official with
very unique statutory and constitutional duties, does the Salt Lake County Commission have the
authority to bind the Assessor in a lump-sum settlement agreement?
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IV.
COMPUTATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Lastly, Alliant seeks an award of attorneys' fees against the Salt Lake County Assessor.
Various affidavits have been filed by Maxwell A. Miller, Esq. and Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq.,
attorneys for Alliant Techsystems, Inc. In addition, Alliant supports its claim for fees by an
affidavit of Charles R. Brown, Esq., an attorney who practices with the Salt Lake City law firm of
Clyde, Snow, Sessions and Swenson and who was selected as Distinguished Tax Practitioner of
the Year for 1995-1996 by the Tax Section of the Utah State Bar.
Defendant, Salt Lake County Assessor, and Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
argue the fees are grossly out of proportion for the amount of work done. Mr. Smith, in behalf of
the Board, argues that this case involves two non-evidentiary hearings before the Utah State Tax
Commission and this Court, no witness preparation, and no expert witness preparation. The
Board challenges the summary block billing statements and argues that Alliant has not met its duty
to categorize time and fees, to separate the recoverablefromthe non-recoverable, and to
appropriately apportion fees.
This Court is responsive to the block billing argument and the apportionment of fees
argument. While issues and parties are intertwined, there appears to be no legitimate attempt at
apportionment.
At oral argument Mr. Smith, who argued in behalf of the Board, the ultimate payor, and
the Assessor, conceded that $10,000-$ 15,000 would be reasonable for each hearing.
The Court awards attorneys' fees in the sum of $30,000, finding that Alliant simply
failed to meet its burden further.
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Alliant Techsystems, Inc. is instructed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law which merge its first proposed Findings and Conclusions together with its [Proposed and
Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement, as discussed above.
Dated this 7

day of June, 2002.
BY THE COURT

W. DAVIS; JUDGE

ti£SU&te
cc:

Max Miller, Esq.
Randy Grimshaw, Esq.
Kelly Wright, Esq.
Michelle Bush, Esq.
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
Craig Smith, Esq.
Brett Rich, Esq.
David Pearce, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

TAX COURT DECISION
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 990402607
DATE: SEPTEMBER 19,2001
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN,
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT
OVERS ON, in their official capacities as the
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,
Defendants.

CLERK: SGJ

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Randy M. Grimshaw
Maxwell A. Miller

Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

John McCarry, Assistant Attorney General
Michelle Snow, Assistant Attorney General

Utah State Tax Commission

Bill Thomas Peters
Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake District
Attorney

Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry
Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy
Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County
Commission at the Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Summary Judgment stage
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J. Craig Smith

Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board
of Equalization at the Motion to Approve
Settlement Stage

I, Hl\ Wripht

Salt Lake County Assessor

John E. S. Robson

Granite »Si lit nil I )i »ti itt

There in 1 n« m pending before the Court various motions from both sides. Rulings on
various motions have been staved becaiisi nl '\llhinl * Mnlmn Inr \pproval of Settlement which
was filed on or about March 1, 2001.
This Court will attempt to outline the legal arguments gleaned from oral argument,
itiHix ir.Hula and various reply briefs of each party. Please consider the follow, >
PENDING MOTION #1
ALL1AN I S N
I H 11 ION FOR PARTIAL SUMM 4 i n II DGMENT
FILED AlfCit 1ST 24,1 W l
The motion was "limited to defendants" unlawful taxation of N I R O P property, and In
iJaiiiLs i elated to that unlawful taxation." Alliant alleges that "because the federal government, in
fins instance the I hilled States Navy, and not plaintiff, has and exercises the most significant
incidents of ownership over its NIRDP KM! .mil pci .una! pmpert) which plaintiff manages under
contract with the United States Navy, such proper!} is immune ft < mi assessment arid taxation 1»3
defendant Salt Lake County and/or any of its subdivisions under Article VI of the United States
Constitution." (See generally Alliant's Motion to Supplement Record With After-Acquired
1 rsfiitintn .)
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PENDING MOTION #2
TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED JUNE 1,2000
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

TAX COMMISSION

(ARGUMENTS taken from Tax Commission's Reply
Memo in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment 6-12000)
POINT ONE: Alliant is not exempt from the Utah privilege
tax, UCA§ 59-4-101
* Alliant claims an exemption from the privilege
tax under UCA 59-4-10 l(3)(e) which exempts
"the use or possession of any lease, permit, or
easement unless the lease, permit, or easement
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive
possession of the premises to which the lease,
permit, or easement relates..."
1. Tax Commission argues Alliant has not
pled, nor can it show, that it uses NIROP
pursuant to any "lease, permit or easement."
2. Alliant cannot show that its use of
NIROP is not "exclusive."
3. Alliant must prove it is exempt which it
has not done.
4. The exemption statute must be construed
strictly against the taxpayer (Newspaper
Agency Corp. v. Auditing Division. 938 P.2d
266, 270 (Utah, 1997).
** "Even if the Court construes Alliant's contract to be a
"lease, permit or easement," the Court must reject Alliant's
argument for exemption."
1. Alliant argues "exclusive possession" as used in
the statute, must be interpreted to mean that the
possession is exclusive of everyone, including the
owner. The Tax Commission argues "exclusive
possession" must be read to mean that the possession
is exclusive of everyone but the owner or lessor. Tax
Commission directs the Court to Thiokol Chem.
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Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964) where
it states the intent of the statute is to "close the gap
in the tax laws by imposing a tax on any property
possessed or used in connection with a business for
profit which was otherwise exempt from taxation."
2. NIROP is the only contractor with a contract for
the use of NIROP.
3. NIROP is not open to the public, or other
contractors.
4. The Navy's (owner) exercise of its rights to the
property should not change the conclusion that
Alliant's possession of NIROP is exclusive.

POINT TWO; The privilege tax against Alliant does not
violate the Supremacy Clause.
1. Tax Commission argues that Alliant's
argument is that the privilege tax is
unconstitutional because it measures tax with
reference to the value of exempt property.
Commission argues this same argument was
rejected in U.S. v. City of Detroit 355, U.S. 466,
470. (See Reply Memo p. 6-7)
PENDING MOTION #3
TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

TAX COMMISSION

POINT ONE; The Utah Constitution and the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d
435 establish the limits of the district court's original
jurisdiction over tax matters.
POINT TWO; The Court lacks jurisdiction because
plaintiff must first exhaust its administrative remedies.
POINT THREE; Alliant is barred by Res Judicata
T a x Commission issued a final decision on the
taxability of NIROP and Alliant cannot thus bring
this original action.
POINT FOUR; Declaratory relief is barred where another
action is pending with the same issues.
-4-
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POINT FIVE: The Court should dismiss Alliant's section
1983 action because Alliant has an adequate remedy under
state law.
THE ASSESSOR, COUNTY COMMISSION, AND BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
SUPPORTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED JUNE 1,2000
ALLIANT

(The following arguments are taken from Alliant's Reply
"Memo addressing Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.)
POINT ONE: There is no constitutional bar to the
"independent" action.
-Creation of tax court certainly provides no
limitation on the rights taxpayers have had for
years to institute independent court proceedings
against erroneous, illegal and unlawful tax
assessments (see UCA §§ 59-1-301, 59-2-1321,
59-2-1326,59-2-1327).
POINT TWO; The Tax Commission's final decision is not
res judicata in the "independent" proceeding on the taxation
ofNIROP.
1. Tax Commission's decision on NIROP dealt
primarily with valuation issues and secondarily
with the application of the privilege tax to NIROP
under Utah State Law. The Commission did not
address nor should it have, federal law issues,
which must be raised in an independent action.
2. Tax Commission decision was for 1995-96, the
"independent" action involves 1995-1999.
3. Certain causes of action in the "independent
proceeding are asserted under express statutory
provisions vesting jurisdiction in the district courts
to adjudicate taxes "deemed unlawful by the party
whose property is taxed." UCA 59-1-301, 59-21321, 59-2-1326 and 59-2-1327.
POINT THREE: Alliant may assert a claim under 42
U.S.C. §1983 (see Reply Memo, p. 6-11).
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POINT FOUR: Alliant is entitled to property and
privilege tax exemption under Utah Law. UCA § 59-4101(3) (fully quoted on p. 16 of the memo).
-Alliant's use of NIROP is not exclusive. It is
controlled and limited by the Navy.
POINT FIVE: Alliant does not assert the Supremacy
Clause.
-Alliant makes a fair apportionment argument
under the commerce clause. (Tax Commission
argues that the cases cited here by Alliant have
nothing to do with the commerce clause and must
fall under the Supremacy Clause). (Reply Memo
p. 24-29).
PENDING MOTION #4
ALLIANT'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT FILED MARCH 1,2001
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS,
INC.

-BROKERED SETTLEMENT
(Taken from both the Memorandum and Reply
Memorandum in Support of Settlement.)
-District Court has jurisdiction to approve Settlement.
a. "If the Court dismisses the NIROP action for
lack of jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless can*
and should approve the SETTLEMENT
agreement in the "consolidated valuation cases."
By the terms of the Settlement Agreement, if
approved, there could be no appeal from a
dismissal of the NIROP action and the matter
would be moot." (p. 8 Reply Memo)
-Board of Equalization had authority to settle.
a. Board's power to settle comes from Utah
Const. Art. XIII, sec. 11(7) AND UCA 59-21000, and public policy favoring settlements.
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b. The Assessor's duty to assess fair market value
(59-2-302, 59-2-102) is not solely his. Board can
also assess fair market value (UCA 59-2-103(1),
and Utah Const. Art. XIII sec 2(1)).
c. Assessor's duty to assess property at fair
market value is constitutionally subordinate to the
Board's duty to equalize assessment. See Rio
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184
("Where it is impossible to achieve perfectly both
the standard of true value and the standard of
uniformity and equality, the latter standard should
prevail.")
d. Neither Assessor nor Granite has veto power
over the Board's ability to settle.
-Settlement Agreement binds Assessor.
a. Agreement states: "Salt Lake County, its
officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in
concert with Alliant
"
b. Alliant is entitled to attorney's fees against the
Assessor for having to compel him to honor the
agreement.
-Board of Equalization is bound by Settlement.
a. New Board argues prior Board cannot enter
into a contract, which controls or limits the future
Board's actions. Alliant argues that the case
relied upon refers to the binding of "governmental
or legislative power" and breaching contracts
made in settlement is not a governmental power.
b. Government entity cannot repudiate its own
settlement offer.
-Court should approve the Settlement.
a. UCA 59-20-1321 provides county legislative
body with the power to refund taxes, or lower
assessments.
b. Sufficient proof was given that wide
discrepancies existed between Alliant and the
Assessor. (See p. 11-26 discussing the prior
adjudicated decisions and the appraisals.)
-7-
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c. The Settlement Agreement contemplates that
this Court will enter an appropriate order lowering
Alliant's assessments and ensuring that the taxing
entities within Salt Lake County may recover
refunded taxes.
1. The language of the settlement calls for
"entry of appropriate judgments and orders
sufficient to authorize Salt Lake County and
the affecting taxing entities within Salt Lake
County to recover all refunds paid the
imposition of an appropriate judgment levy."
-"The prerogative to evaluate the risks and likely costs of
litigation and to choose or compromise between conflicting
appraisals" belongs to the Board of Equalization. Logan
City v.Allen. 44 P.2d 1085.
-Board of Equalization is authorized to "adjust and equalize
the valuation and assessment of real and personal property
within their respective counties." UCA §59-2-1000
SALT LAKE COUNTY
BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION

-BROKERED SETTLEMENT
(New Board is neutral to settlement)
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum to the Joint
Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement.")
-Board of Equalization changed its entire membership on
January 2,2001.
-Remaining neutral the new Board argues that it is not
bound by the settlement.
* government bodies "cannot make a contract
which is binding on the municipality after the
end of such governing body's term of office."
Bair v. Lavton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902
(Utah 1957).

SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR

-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.")
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-Argues Assessor is a necessary party for settlement.
(UCA §59-2-1001(5)).
* Assessor was not a party of the settlement.
* Assessor is not bound by the settlement.
-Argues the Court lacks jurisdiction over '97, '98, '99.
*Settlement covers ' 97, '98, '99 issues (Tax
Commission has jurisdiction).
*And settlement covers '95, '96 NIROP (Court
has jurisdiction).
-Argues NIROP issue res judicata.
*Tax Commission found NIROP property
lawfully taxable subject to UCA §59-4-101 in
November 1998.
-Argues settlement invalid because it does not address
valuation.
*Fair Market Value not addressed: this violates
UCA §59-2-301, UCA 59-2-102 and Utah
Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2.
-Argues Board of Equalization lacks the power to broker
the settlement.
*UCA §59-2-1347 allows "county legislative
body" to refund taxes and Board of Equalization
is not the legislative body.
T h e mere possibility of losing the litigation
does not justify ignoring constitutional and
statutory mandates.
-Argues ("Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion
for Approval of Settlement") that the Assessor is legally
bound to assess all property uniformly and equal based on
"fair market value." UCA §59-2-301, 59-2-102.
-Assessor has a statutory right to appeal the decisions of
the Board of Equalization. UCA §59-2-1006(1).
UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION

-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion to Approve Settlement.")

-9-
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-COURT LACKS JURISDICTION (refers the Court to
Assessor's Memorandum at p. 16-17).
-Court must ignore issues of valuation methodology (p. 34).
-March 7, 2001 the Tax Commission denied the proposed
settlement finding as follows:
1. Granite petitioned to intervene 11-17-2000.
2. Alliant and Commission knew Granite
petitioned to intervene and requested to be a
party in the resolution.
3. Granite was a necessary party to any
settlement as of 11-17-2000.
4. Approval of the settlement "would require a
necessary party that had moved to intervene
prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such
a settlement against its will."
GRANITE SCHOOL
DISTRICT

-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.")
-Board of Equalization lacks the authority to make a
settlement that ignores fair market value.
-Utah Constitution requires all property to be taxed
uniformly and equally.
-Settlement is not in the best interests of the County.
PENDING MOTION #5

ALLIANT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD WITH
AFTER-ACQUIRED TESTIMONY FILED JULY 30,2001
This motion has been dealt with separately by the Court.
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PENDING MOTION #6
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
FILED MARCH 12,2001
Assessor argues that any attempt to include valuation testimony at this point is beyond
the scope of settlement.
This motion has been dealt with separately by the Court.
I.
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
The creation of a tax court by statute is of recent vintage. This Court's authority is
governed by law and the Constitution. The Court must analyze its authority carefully. Consider:
As argued by defendants,
As a general rule, "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to seeking judicial review," State Tax Commission v. Iverson. 782 P.2d 519, 524
(Utah 1989).
As argued by plaintiff,
A duly constituted tax court in the State of Utah has jurisdiction to decide whether
Salt Lake County's imposition of a privilege tax violates state or federal law or both. Bluth v.
Tax Commission, 2001 Ut App 138, 420 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Ct App. 2001) 2001 Utah App.
Lexis 35). This Court is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari. In
addition the Court may consider whether injunctive/declaratory relief is exclusively within the
province of the Court, as opposed to the Utah State Tax Commission.
Next, the Court must also consider in the statutory/constitutional mix, the fact that these
parties have entered into a settlement agreement which contains specific language requiring a
district court approval. Certainly, while jurisdiction cannot be stipulated to, the parties have
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agreed procedurally to have a district court review and either approve or disapprove of the
settlement.
It seems to this Court that should the Court disapprove and reject the Settlement
Agreement, then it must return and carefully rule on the pending Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, and other motions. Should this Court approve the settlement, then
most of the issues and arguments of the parties are moot.
II.
SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
An agreement was entered into by the litigants or their attorneys while matters were
pending both before the Utah State Tax Commission and this Tax Court. As addressed above,
the parties may not by stipulation invest a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
cause which it would not otherwise have had. The parties understood this basic concept and
required approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Court/District Court.
A court should give stipulations or agreements of the parties a "fair and liberal
construction, consistent with the apparent intention of the parties, the spirit of justice, and the
futherance of fair trials upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one calculated to
defeat the purpose of their making." (See generally 73 Am Jur 2nd §§ 7, 541.) While courts
generally look upon stipulated settlements with favor, legitimate judicial scrutiny is necessary.
The Court, in a settlement agreement, ought to look at the circumstances surrounding the parties
at the time of making, ought to look for internal language and term consistency, ought to examine
whether the result is against public policy, and whether the agreed upon result is
constitutionally/statutorily sanctioned. Relief from a settlement agreement may be granted due to
constitutional impairment.

-12u

A.
Is This Court Barred by the Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission?
The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the State Tax
Commission and the District Court. It was brought to this Court's attention the day before oral
argument that the State Tax Commission rejected the Settlement Agreement. Is the Settlement
Agreement simply null and void? Is the Court bound by that decision, even if this Court
determines the controlling facts to be distinguishable? This Judge is of the opinion that the Tax
Court is not bound by the decision of rejection by the Utah State Tax Commission. Had the Tax
Commission focused on constitutional deficiencies and problematic implementation of the
agreement, this Court would have taken clear notice and given in-depth scrutiny to the reasoning.
But the Commission seemed to base its decision primarily on the failure of the settlement to
include a potential intervenor. (See paragraphs 1 - 4 of the State Tax Commission decision.) As
emphasized below, the factual basis relied upon by the Tax Commission does not exist here. A
motioned intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to intervene has been
filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. If a county commission must include not only the
litigants, but also a representative from every conceivable taxing entity in a settlement agreement,
then, as pointed out by plaintiff, a Mosquito Abatement District could hold the litigants hostage.1
It is a matter of record in this Court that the Board of Education of Granite School
District faxed a copy of its Motion to Intervene under Rule 24 (a) on December 7, 2000 and filed

Of course this Court recognizes that the Granite School District has a far greater interest in this dispute
than other taxing entities. If the State Tax Commission "Order on Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement" is
accurate, the "Granite School District is the single largest recipient of the property tax revenue that was the subject
of the dispute and would be responsible for approximately fifty percent of the refund, or about $2.5 million." (See
Order at paragraph 13, page 3 attached to Utah State Tax Commission's Reply Memorandum in Opposition to the
Motion to Approve Settlement.)
Query: If a taxing entity, even a major stakeholder, is entitled to be a party to a settlement agreement and
has the power to defeat an agreement, and the matter is thereafter heard on the merits, and the "refund" far exceeds
the stipulated refund, then what? Can other taxing entities look to the intervenor for relief?
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an original on January 8,2001. If counsel for Alliant is accurate, the stipulated settlement
agreement was entered into on December 5, 2000 and was approved by the Salt Lake County
Commission on December 6,2000. It is clear that there wasn't even a faxed copy of a motion to
intervene on file with this Court at the time of the settlement. If the motion did not precede the
County Commission action, then this Court cannot give any weight to a potential filing of a
potential intervenor who potentially might become a future party to the action.2 Having said all of
this, this Court admits ignorance as to Granite School District's status, if any, in any pending
matters before the Utah State Tax Commission. From the Utah State Tax Commission decision it
appears that a motion to intervene may have been filed as early as November 17, 2000 in those
matters.
This Court is charged with the duty to independently review the settlement agreement
and clearly the circumstances surrounding intervention before the Utah State Tax Commission
were not extant before this Court. As argued by Alliant, the "factual basis upon which the Tax
Commission entirely rested its decision is not present here. There was no motion to intervene
before the settlement agreement was consummated." It is the opinion of this Court that the ruling
of the Utah State Tax Commission does not preclude this Court from independently examining
the Settlement Agreement.
C.
Is the Settlement Agreement Defeated by the Salt Lake County Assessor's
Claim that He is Not a Party to the Settlement Agreement?

2

Granite School District did not rely upon a "necessary party" theory before this Court. Granite makes no
mention of this theory in its "Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement" or at
oral argument on the motion to approve settlement. Granite focused on the Board of Equalization's lack of
authority to enter into a settlement that ignores fair market value, the constitutional defects of the settlement
because it ignores requirements that all property be taxed uniformly and equally, and the fact that settlement is not
in the best interests of the County. In addition Granite does rely on the totality of the Tax Commission decision
which would arguably bar this Court from approving the settlement; there is nothing to approve.
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Prior to the adoption of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or proposal was circulated
that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors." etc. as the parties to the action. The
"assessors" language was stricken out. The Settlement Agreement which was agreed to indicates
"Salt Lake County, its officers." etc.
That agreement/letter, agreed to and adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County
Commission bears the signature of Karl Hendriksen, Deputy District Attorney. It was an offer of
settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties. No one can contend that the duly
elected Salt Lake County Assessor is not an officer of Salt Lake County. He is. He is a nominal
party to the Settlement Agreement.
This Court appreciates the unique duties and role of a county assessor. A county
assessor has statutory charges which frequently place him/her at odds with the decisions of a
board of equalization. The assessor necessarily "checks" the decisions of the board and the
assessor may appeal decisions of the Board of Equalization on various grounds. Nonetheless, the
Court finds that the Salt Lake County Assessor, as an officer of Salt Lake County, is a nominal
party to the settlement agreement. The Salt Lake County Commission has authority to legally
bind the County and its officers.
D.
The Settlement Agreement - What Do We Know About This Settlement
Agreement Which Would Suggest Approval, Validity and Enforceability
by This Court?
Consider:
1. The Settlement Agreement was reduced to writing;
2. The parties were present and/or represented by legal counsel;
3. The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization were ratified/approved
by the Salt Lake County Commission; (This fact alone may cast this case in a different posture
than some case law cited as controlling.)
-15-
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4. There was a consideration of the risk of liability together with the costs and trouble
of protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion
relative to the merits of the respective claims.
5. The terms and conditions are fairly detailed;
6. No party was misled, deceived or defrauded in the process;
7. The Agreement does not dictate how a court should resolve questions of law;
8. The purpose and clear intent of the parties to settle is unequivocable;
9. The Settlement Agreement/letter was drafted by Salt Lake County, who now
attempts to invalidate and reject its own detailed language on statutory, constitutional and
pragmatic grounds;
10. There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties
to the Settlement Agreement;
11. The Agreement does not divest the Court of jurisdiction;
12. There is no evidence that these parties entered into the Settlement Agreement based
upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy.
13. The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and certainly has authority
to resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. This Settlement Agreement
was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and then was
adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission. As a general rule, a court ought not to
substitute its judgment for that of duly elected officials. Either this Settlement Agreement was
entered into in good faith, or it was an absolute sham. Whether this Court likes the result, agrees
with the methodology, believes the amount of the settlement to be fair, is of absolutely no
consequence.
E.
Deficiencies of the Settlement Agreement
-16-

Though the intent of the parties is patently clear, the deficiencies are likewise clear.
Consider:
1. At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the opportunity to
fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property uniformly and equally based upon UCA §59-2-302
and UCA §59-2-102,1953, as amended;
2. The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon
fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value violates UCA §59-2-301, UCA 59-2-102
and Utah Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2.
3. Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax Commission the Settlement
Agreement must be defeated on its face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive
because the "conditional language" of the agreement plain and clear;
4. The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the Settlement
Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated
resolution for five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with differing
jurisdictions.
5. There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the $5 million dollar
settlement amount to separate years; allocation would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions
and further, if the tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare;
6. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple jurisdictions;
7. The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the Settlement
Agreement;
8. The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement Agreement is that the
terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust and the Agreement entirely ignores uniform and
equal taxation statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally flawed because
there is no attempt to achieve fair market value. Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be
achieved.
-17-
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9. The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases.
10. The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement Agreement.
11. Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to reject the
Settlement Agreement.
12. The Settlement cannot be implemented in its current form because it fails to reflect
fair market value assessments.
III.
DECISION OPTIONS AND DISCUSSION
The difficulties in reaching a decision in this case are legion and rest first with the
jurisdictional challenges (NIROP), second with the Utah State Tax Commission disapproval of the
settlement agreement and the implications on this Court's decision, and third with severability
issues both as jurisdiction and the award. If the Court then factors in the position of the Salt Lake
County Assessor that he was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, and the merits of the
arguments of the other defendants, the permutations increase geometrically. The following
decisional permutations do not address and isolate the myriad of the legal or constitutional claims
for disapproval. Please consider:
Decision Options
Category

Possible Decisions

I. Conditional Settlement Agreement
This Court is simply barred from any
approval because of the rejection by the Utah
State Tax Commission and the conditional
language of the agreement. The Tax
Commission decision is dispositive. End of
inquiry!

1. Automatic disapproval.

Of course the obvious downside to the
automatic disapproval position is the fact
that the basis of the dispositive decision
-18-
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might turn out to be reversible error. Then
what?
Certainly any basis for rejection must be
legally sustainable. The Utah State Tax
Commission position should not paint this
Court into a corner of no escape. What if
the refund is not divisible, but the jurisdiction
clearly is?
If the Tax Court approves the settlement
and the Utah State Tax Commission rejects
it, but on non-sustainable grounds, or vice
versa, where does that leave the parties? Is a
divisibility of the refund award the only clear
legal option and solution until appellate
courts opine?

II. Global/Plenary Jurisdiction
The Court may determine pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, that it
has independent plenary jurisdiction. This
decision requires no severability of
jurisdiction or severability of the refund.
This decision places the Court decision
and Tax Commission decision on a collision
course in the appellate courts on
jurisdictional grounds.

2. Not approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
3. Not approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.
4. Approve Settlement - Award no attorney
fees.
5. Approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.

The Settlement Agreement contemplates
a resolution of all disputes between the
parties. Arguably, without even reaching the
merits of the Court's jurisdiction as to
NIROP, the Court could conclude that the
NIROP action is a pending action, and if the
$5 million Settlement Agreement is global,

ui
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then it would include all claims including
NIROP and even those pending before the
Utah State Tax Commission. There is no
language in the Settlement Agreement that
would carve out or except out the NIROP
action.

HI. Limited Jurisdiction
1995 & 1996 consolidated valuation
cases and NIROP where jurisdiction is
contested.
A decision in this category requires both
severability of jurisdiction and severability of
the refund in order to approve the Settlement
Agreement plus a decision favoring Alliant as
to the merits of the constitutional and
statutory arguments. A disapproval may be
reached either by the lack of authority to
sever the refund, or a ruling in favor of the
defendants on the merits of other arguments.

6. Not approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
7. Not approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.
8. Approve Settlement - Award no attorney
fees.
9. Approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.

A decision of this limited jurisdiction
including NIROP is contrary to the position
of some defendants and, again, would place
the Court's decision and the Tax
Commission decision in a collision course in
the appellate courts.
As addressed in Category II above, the
Settlement Agreement contemplates a
resolution of all disputes between the parties.
Arguably, without reaching the merits of
arguments respecting the Court's jurisdiction
as to NIROP, the Court could conclude that
the NIROP action is a pending action, and if
the Court finds that it has plenary jurisdiction
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over actions pending before it, then the
Court could include all claims including
NIROP. Again, if the Court finds that
jurisdction is severable, there is no language
in the Settlement Agreement that would
carve out or except out the NIROP action.

IV. Limited Jurisdiction II
1995 and 1996 consolidated valuation
cases only.

10. Not approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
11. Not approve Settlement - Award
attorney fees.

If this Court determines that it may
proceed on the 1995 and 1996 consolidated
valuation cases, in order to approve the
Settlement Agreement, then it must first
adopt a severability of jurisdiction theory,
and then a severability of refund theory, plus
make a decision favorable to Alliant as to the
merits of the constitutional and statutory
arguments. A disapproval may be reached
either by the lack of authority to sever the
amount of the refund, or a ruling in favor of
defendants on their arguments.

12. Approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
13. Approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.

There are at least thirteen different options or decisions available to this Court. It is
also entirely possible for the Court to adopt some hybrid.
As all parties are aware, the Court has labored over this decision. Each party should
know the reason why. It is the opinion of this Court that the Settlement Agreement entered into
by these parties is enforceable, legal and constitutional. The Court rejects the constitutional
challenges. But the difficulty with this decision is the ultimate fact that this Court does not believe
that the stated basis for the Utah State Tax Commission rejection decision, that of a "necessary
party theory," is sustainable as a matter of law.
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How does this Court then approve the Settlement Agreement when the Court is of the
view that the jurisdiction is non-intregrated and is, therefore, divisible, but the refund award is
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years? What a dilemma!
Should the Court simply adopt a less preferable and less legally sustainable position of
refund divisibility? Or should this Court simply reject the legal settlement agreement because of
the Tax Commission rejection and concomitant impossibility of refund allocation? Can the Court
order allocation based upon the "good faith" requirements of the agreement?
With these issues in mind, the Court will discuss attorneys' fees, jurisdiction and finally
rule on the Motion to Approve the Settlement Agreement.
IV.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
The Settlement Agreement/letter provides for an award of attorneys' fees, in pertinent
part as follows:
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in
concert with Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third
District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner.
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement,
the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in
Enforcing the settlement agreement. (See Settlement of Outstanding Alliant
Tech Litigation, counter-offer letter dated December 5, 2000 attached to
"Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Approve Settlement
and in Reply to the Assessor's Memorandum in Opposition to the Joint
Motion.)
Alliant requests attorneys' fees because the Salt Lake County Assessor, having filed a
memorandum in opposition to the joint motion has breached the condition of acting in good faith.
In addition, Alliant seeks attorneys' fees from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
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because it did not, in concert with Alliant, seek to secure an appropriate order... approving the
Settlement Agreement before this Court.
This Court can best define the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization role in the
approval process as "benign neutrality." The Board did not, unlike other parties, object to the
approval of the Settlement Agreement. The court simply concludes that no attorneys' fees can be
awarded against the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
Next, the Court turns to the role of the Salt Lake County Assessor. This role is clear;
he is an advocate for defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invites the Court to void the
agreement on a variety of statutory, factual, and constitutional grounds. This Court has already
found that the Assessor is a party to the Settlement Agreement, at least nominally, as an "officer"
and was so bound by the Salt Lake County Commission.
The Assessor breached the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. It does not matter
who prevails on the motion. The award is independent of which side prevails. Alliant is entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees as may be established by affidavit.
Other parties to this action which oppose the Settlement were not parties to the
Settlement Agreement and not bound by the attorney fee provision.
V.
JURISDICTION
These parties agreed that $5 million would be refunded to Alliant to settle all cases
involving property tax disputes from 1995 to and including 1999. It was a blanket settlement
agreement, but, of course, it did not address future valuations.
Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission maintains jurisdction over some of those years
and this Court maintains jurisdiction over others. This Court has jurisdiction over the 1995 and
1996 consolidated valuation cases and the Utah State Tax Commission maintains jurisdiction over
the 1997, 1998 and 1999 real and personal property cases. It is also clear that the parties fully
recognized that tax matters involving Alliant were pending both before the Tax Court and the
-23-
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Utah State Tax Commission as of the date of the Settlement Agreement; December 7, 2000. The
Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Court would have to rule independently. That just
makes sense.
The Utah State Tax Commission has no authority to approve a settlement with respect
to tax years 1995 and 1996 and this Court has no authority or jurisdiction to approve the
settlement for years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Both this Court and the Utah State Tax Commission
recognize jurisdictional limitations and both reject a global jurisdictional theory.
Next, this Court is of the opinion that the NIROP independent action falls outside the
scope of the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement. A 1983 civil rights cause of
action, together with other causes of action, does not fit into the post-filing Settlement Agreement
of these parties. That fact does not disturb the Settlement Agreement respecting the 1995 and
1996 consolidated valuation cases.
Finally, as emphasized earlier, the facts extant before the Utah State Tax Commission
are distinguishable from the facts here. With due deference to the Utah State Tax Commission,
this Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Granite School District was a necessary party to
the Settlement Agreement for a number of reasons, the chief of which was that it was
inadequately briefed and argued before this Court. To automatically force this Court to reject the
Settlement Agreement on that ground seems legally impermissible to this Court. But then the
appellate courts will instruct us whether the Tax Court view or the Tax Commission view
constitutes reversible error.
DECISION
It is the opinion of this Court that these parties entered into a legal, enforceable,
constitutionally sanctioned Settlement Agreement to resolve and settle their differences for all
cases involving property tax disputes from 1995 to and including 1999. The Settlement
Agreement was entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant. The
intent to settle is unequivocal.
-24-
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Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over some cases and this Court
has jurisdiction over others. The Court recognizes divisibility of jurisdiction between the Court
and the Utah State Tax Commission.
The rejection of the Settlement Agreement by the Utah State Tax Commission does not
exclude this Court from conducting a careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is
not permissible by this Court.
While this Court accepts the divisibility of jurisdiction, it is of the opinion that the
refund amount of $5 million is indivisible and non-allocatable between the various tax years.
Therefore, even though this Court disagrees with the legal theory relied upon by the Utah State
Tax Commission, the Court has no option but to reluctantly disapprove of the Settlement
Agreement. The separately recognized divisibility of jurisdiction does not direct this Court,
legally, to adopt a divisibility of the global refund. The rejection decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission forces this Court to reject a Settlement Agreement which it believes is valid and
legally sustainable. As mentioned earlier, these disparate decisions are on a collision course which
can best be resolved by Utah's appellate courts.
Counsel for plaintiff is instructed to submit an affidavit in support of attorneys' fees and
to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order consistent with this decision.
Plaintiffs filing of the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement delayed this Court's ruling
on:
Alliant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
Tax Commission's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and
Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss (joined by the Salt Lake County
Assessor, Salt Lake county Commission and Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization)
The Court must now turn its attention back to these motions.

-25-
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The Clerk of the Court is instructed to schedule a status conference call with the various
Dated this £0

day of September, 2001.
BYT

, JUDGE
Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq.
Maxwell A. Miller, Esq.
John McCarry, Esq.
Michelle Snow, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
J. Craig Smith, Esq.
Kelly Wright, Esq.
John E. S. Robson, Esq.
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
) OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS,

)

Petitioner,

) Appeal Nos.

98-0452, 98-0608 & 99-0190

)

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

)

) Tax Type:
)

Property Tax/Locally Assessed
Commercial Property

)
)

) Tax Years:
LEE GARDNER, in his capacity as Salt Lake)
County Assessor, and GRANITE SCHOOL )
DISTRICT,
)
) Judge:
Respondents-Intervenors,
)

1997, 1998 and 1999

Davis

)

Presiding:
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner:

Mr. Maxwell Miller, from the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer
Mr. Randy Grimshaw, from the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer
For Respondent: Mr. Bill Thomas Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghom
& Peters
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
For Intervenor, Lee Gardner, Salt Lake County Assessor:
Mr. Bill Thomas Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn
& Peters
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
For Intervenor, Granite School District:
Mr. J. David Pearce, from the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on

April 23, 2001 through April 27, 2001. Each party submitted its Proposed Findings of Fact,
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Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, and Briefs on or about May 14, 2001. Based upon the
evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The tax in question is property tax.
2. The years in question are 1997, 1998 and 1999. The lien dates are January 1,
1997, January 1, 1998 and January 1, 1999.
3. The Salt Lake County Assessor initially valued the land and improvements for
each of the years at issue as follows:
Assessment Year

Assessment Amount

1997
1998

$ 256,402,900
$ 235,850,700

1999

$ 235,848,900

4. The subject property is zoned for commercial and industrial purposes and West
Valley City and Salt Lake County have imposed an over pressure zone which prohibits residential
development around the site. Further, gullies and canyons divide the property and a railroad right-ofway exists through the subject property, so the site cannot be fully utilized because of the
development difficulty posed by the subject's terrain. The property is not vacant or available for
development for residential use. There was no evidence of the likelihood of a change in the zoning
from industrial to residential. The buildings and structures are widely dispersed because of the
highly explosive nature of the manufactured products.
5. The Bacchus Works includes three plants: Plant One, Bacchus West, and the
Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant ("NIROP").
-2UU L
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6. Plant One includes more than 450 buildings, slightly over 40% of which are
devoted to primary purposes (i.e. earth protected and bunkered high tech research and development
structures, administrative, directive and security) and the rest are support facilities (i.e. storage and
shipping).
7. Bacchus West includes approximately 34 major buildings and 27 support
structures. Bacchus West includes specialized features which are uniquely geared toward the
construction of rocket motors.
NIROP PROPERTY
8. Petitioner has alleged that the NIROP property is exempt from property taxes and
is not subject to the privilege tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et.seq.
9. NIROP is a facility which is owned by the United States Navy, but is used by
Petitioner to fulfill and perform its government contracts. The uses and features of the structures
within this facility [NIROP] are similar to those of Plant One.
10. The NIROP property is and has been used for Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)
programs, including D5 (Trident), C3 (Trident), C4 (Poseidon), A3 (Polaris), which are all U.S.
Navy missile systems worked on by Petitioner.
11. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., has a Facilities Use Contract with the Navy for the use
of NIROP. Facilities Use Contract; Affidavit of Robert Kaufman.
12. The contract provides "that the terms and conditions of this facilities use contract
shall apply to these facilities provided to the contractor by the Government... for the contractor's
use in performance of contracts or subcontracts, or both, for the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)
-3-
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systems. The contractor agrees to use, maintain, account for, and dispose of such facilities in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this facilities use contract." Contract, Part I, Section B.
The Facilities Use Contract is attached to the County's NIROP Reply Memorandum.
13. First priority for the use of NIROP shall be given to work on behalf of the Navy.
Contract, Section H. Special Contract Requirements at 3, U 3.
14. Alliant must obtain approval before making either capital modifications to or
usage changes of facilities. Contract, Section H. Special Contract Requirements at 3, ^ 4.
15.

The FAR 52.245-11(e)(1) requires the Contractor (Alliant) to notify the

Contracting Office . . . (1) Whenever use of all facilities for government work in any quarterly period
averages less than 75 percent of the total use of the facilities."
16. In addition to using NIROP for SSP programs, Alliant uses NIROP for non-FBM
purposes such as storage, testing and shipping commercial rocket motors. Affidavit of Kim J.
Abplanalp at 4, K 12; Affidavit of Robert E. Kaufman at 5, ^ 16.
17. Alliant operates NIROP within the bounds of the Facilities Use Contract and
cannot do more or less than that. J. Foote, Tr. April 23, 2001 at 166-67.
18. NIROP contains 145 major structures and support and storage buildings.
Affidavit of Ed Kent at 4, U 10.
19. There are approximately 100 actively used buildings at NIROP. Tr. at 773.
20. Robert Reilly concluded that approximately 36 of the buildings at NIROP were
functionally obsolete and that an additional 10 buildings suffered some functional obsolescence. P.
Reilly-2, Exh. VIII; Exh. XI; Exh. XIV. This leaves approximately 100 actively used buildings at
-4-
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NIROP.
21. The entire Bacchus Works facility, including NIROP, is enclosed in fencing,
warns trespassers to keep out and is not open to the public. No member of the public may gain
entrance to the Bacchus Works, including NIROP, without the express permission of Alliant.
Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, If 17.
22. In order to gain access to the Bacchus Works facility, including NIROP, one must
pass through Alliant's designated entrance, register with Alliant's security officers at Alliant's
administration building, obtain permission from an Alliant employee to gain access, wear an Alliant
identification badge, and be transported to, from and through the facility by an Alliant employee in
an Alliant vehicle. Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, ^ 18.
23. The entrance of NIROP does not require separate permission, registration,
identification, or accompaniment by a Navy employee. Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, U 19.
24. The Navy's Trident II (commonly called the D-5) rocket motor is not primarily
produced at NIROP. The primary manufacturing process of the Trident rocket motor is at Alliant's
privately owned facility located at Bacchus West. NIROP property is used in a supporting role in the
manufacturing process, but all of the actual rocket motor manufacturing occurs on Alliant's privately
owned property. Affidavit of Ed Kent at 5, f 20.
25. Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the Titan (and Trident), has an on-site
team, located very close to Alliant's program office, and the Lockheed Martin team communicates
and interacts daily with Alliant employees. J. Foote, Dep. at 37-40.
26. Lockheed's on-site team for Titan is to provide contract interface, and quality
-5• ' o O -1 2
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oversight.

The team verifies that Alliant is producing consistent with the contract and that

production lines are under correct controls. J. Foote, Dep. at 40.
27. Lockheed's on-site interface with Alliant for Titan is more than what is typical of
prime contractors. J. Foote, Dep. at 40.
28. Boeing also has on-site representatives doing customer subcontracting duties and
is there to oversee quality and ensure that the right disciplines are followed. J. Foote, Dep. at 41.
29. The Navy employees are doing quality inspections and verifications. They are
monitoring Alliant but are not involved in manufacturing. J. Foote, Tr. April 23, 2001 at 163.
30. The Navy does not have the actual day-to-day management and direction over the
production of rocket motors at Bacchus West. Robert Kaufman Dep. at 13.
31. Alliant uses the NIROP property, in accordance with the terms and conditions of
its supply contract. The Navy maintains an office at the Alliant facilities, for the purpose of
providing technical assistance under Navy supply and facilities contracts. Affidavit of Sumsion at 3,
T| 5, attached to the County's Reply Memorandum on NIROP. Alliant's employees use, maintain,
dispose of and account for the NIROP facilities in accordance with the facilities use contracts.
Affidavit of Sumsion at 3, ^j 6.
32. The Navy's interaction with Alliant with respect to its supply and facilities
contracts is similar to the relationship Alliant has with its onsite prime contractors, Lockheed Martin
and Boeing, which is one of oversight of quality and activities consistent with contract production
specifications. This relationship is not equivalent to management or control by the Navy over
Alliant's manufacturing of solid rocket motors, or its use of NIROP in support thereof.
-6uu£0 i i
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33. NIROP is used by Alliant in connection with the supply contracts for solid rocket
motors i or tl le I ridei it II (I) 5). \:f!ida vit c if Sten "e Si lmsion at 2, 'f 3.
34. Alliant is entitled to earn a profit on the Trident supply contracts. J. Foote Tr.
April 23, 2001 at m .
i he Navy does have some employeesjo&ihi-; >r» '.ner^. \vhQ.arglhere.prjm^yJtor
repair, maintenance, and administrative purposes.
PURCHASE OF THE PROPER!T
3()

'\Iliaul acquired the Bacchus Works facility as part of its purchase of the

Hercules aerospace business from Hercules Incorporated ("Hercules"). The Hercules/Alliant sale
occurred pursu»ml In ,i Pi u chase ai id Sale Agreement between the pai ties dated Octobei 28 1994.
The closing date of the sales transaction was March 1 5. 1 °95.
37. \ t tii,; lime u; me sale, Allium and Hercules were pi lblic coi i ipai lies , 1 laving i 10
con )i noi I directors, officers or employees. Both parties to the sale undertook extensive due diligence.
The sale price was negotiated by the parties at arm's length.
38. I lei cules ai id A Ill ai it detei i i lii led tl lat tl ie pi u chase price A lliant ' voi lid pay
Hercules for its aerospace assets "shall be the net book value as of the closing date plus 66 million
dollars." By "net book value", the parties to the sales transaction meant "assets transfei i ed minus
i

39. In a prior proceeding Petitioner represented, and the Commission found., that the
amounts paid Ur> ihj; property of Hercules were as le-ikrw .

-7.,
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Cash paid from Alliant to Hercules

$247,547,000

Advance payment under license ugic..; • . •

$

|V;ter,.t.:t .... - o n

a(jvance

payments

$

- •*• »0
551,000

Stock paid from Alliant to Hercules
(3,862,069 shares @ $29/share)

$112,000,000

Total paid by troni Alliant In Hercules

$374,197,000

Transaction expenses paid to third parties
(investment bankers, accountants, lawyers)

$ 11.250,000

•
*

'

:

-1 • •«! s

$385,447.000

a addition, Ailiant also assumed $230,662,574 of the liabilities of Menul-1 s

raising the total consideration for the sale to $616,109,574.
. :*

. •

:

•

•

• •'

• ' i J ^ a ! per; ^nal and intangible

property in Utah and other states-* The Utah property was located in oaii LUK_ ua\ ::• un. i. •< ..-.
Counties, with the majority being in Salt Lake County.
I " Petitioner made allocation.; o| tbr iHirehasc price between real, personal and
intangible properties for book and tax purposes. Additional accoui iting allocations between tl le
various geograpla. . J !<••• a*:ons were also made, but it is not clear that any such allocations were
based upon fair market value.
43. Net book value (defined by Petitioner as original cost less depreciation) is not the
same concept as the cost method of valuation which is usually replacement cost (ai uu i: JU .-..

<J±S

economic (not accounting) ck-pn nation Hutln the depieri.itioii foi the two concepts is calculated
differently. In addition, assets operating as a unit have an enhanced market value over the separate
value of each individual asset, because those assets are already lie laneo . , . • . . . :
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Theiofoic, fair maiket value is not the same thing as net book value as that term was used by
Petitioner.
STIPULAHONS
44. On or about February 16, 2000, the parties entered into a "Stipulation and Joint
Motion for Scheduling Order", a copy of which is attached hereto, and the iaclual u pie; entatn-n ...<
incorporated hueni I v icineme.
45. On or about April 17,2001, the parties entered into a "Stipulation" regarding land
values for the property at issue, a copy ol winili i J \ ill i h I liu t

and 11

I « li i

^presentations arr i! ><> itn oiporated heiein by reference.
46 Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the Commission finds the land \ aJues,
excluding any eiiett oi cuiiLiininaliuii mil ni lii'iiu aie JI inflow
Year

Value

1997
1998

$
$

35,54^,692
39,322,360

1999

$

41,052,358

4 7 I uither, based upon the stipulations, the Commission finds the reproduction cost
of the improvements, less physical depreciation, i > a* iollov >:

-9-
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As of January 1
FACILITY

199 7

1998

1999 .

PLANT 1

.1; M , 7 " 7 y '<>

$ 63,263,144

$ 63,538,813

NIROP

$ 38,082,662

$ 38,676,540

$ 38,669,210

BACCHUS WES7

$ 104,163,666

$ 106,633.254

$ 107.50CS.J.'4

SI JBTOTAI

$ 204 OP.898

$ 208,572,938

$ 209,716,217

Deletions

$

-

Additions

$

TOTAI

$204,013,898

$

-

$

!•-./•<•

$ 209,386,474

$

-

$211,197552o

ISSUES
48. ' I'he "i lltimate issi ic for the Coi ni :i lission to determine in this proceeding is the fair
market value of Alliant's taxable real property in Salt Lake County as of January 1, 1997, 1998 and
1999 as defined in v i«n i.uJi Ann. §~4>-~ i' .
11

: determinations of value are normally made using three (3) separate approaches to

value, i.e., the cost approach, the market or comparable sales approach, arid the income approach.
The painJ ;u:\- ^ i .i,

- ••

-

\'

in tlus case because of a lack of

reasonable information to use to make an estimate of value based on either of the other approaches to
value. The Commission concurs and agrees that the cost aj p:^;

. • i- I ::. •

determii i.e tl le fail i i larket "1 ' ah :ie of the property of Petitioner.
50. Because the parties have agreed on the value of the land (except for the effects of
contamination and stigma), and the reprodi n

.

sical depreciatioi i for the

-10-
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improvements; it would normally be a matter of adding those two (2) amounts together to detennine
the total value. However, there are issues which have been raised \\m. :. ru-in^ ::JI A:III . •
result in JLHILJIIXIII! HI the ipahir \<hir|] i<suc^ are"
a.

Hie amount, if any, of decrement in the land values for contamination
of the soil.

I

.

;) .

decrement in the land values for stigma

associated wnh the land because of the contamination, which may make
UiL- : . ; ; , . • i i l t K . 1 . .

c.

ine amount, if am. of decrement in the value of the improvements,
caused by functional obsolescence.
!

«

.*»T> -

value of the improvements

caused by external or economic obsolescence.
e

•-. ncUi^i uic ^ i u e ol 11 IC NIRi >1' pMpnls ' Imuld h* inii,iy< .1 I'M HI l l r
total value of the property because it is owned by the United States
Navy and (Petitioner alleges) is not subject to tax pursuant to the
pi ovisioi is of ( Jtal I Code Aiin §59 4-101.
CONTAMINATION

. 5i. i jwUvxnerhasproposec aacuiuik;:, m-m u. : •

.

^cpU

:ncin :- '

tjeprec latiori) value;, stipulated to hv the parties to adjust for contamination which has occurred on
the property. Because of the contamination, the property is subject to Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action pursuant io a uuisnn unlei between I lerci ilt/s, Inn (Iht;
-11-
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former owner of the property) and the State of Utah. That consent order requires certain corrective
action and contamination monitoring.
5"

]

-v:..'..••] =• *

,.,•..!•!. ". ,iM : ; ,r, '-jmRCNLD for contamination be based

upon its projected monitoring costs, and page 29 of Exhibit 1 Reilly projects those monitoring costs
to be $500,000 per year. 1 herefore, Petitioner has requesieu

:^

n i \ all le fc i i i lonitoi ii ig

rnsts(»n;X,(K)(MKHi|(ii l'W7 %n SOU 000 for 1998, and $7,000,000 for 1999. .
5 3. The actual costs of remediation to tlic RCRA corrective action for the years 1997
to 1999 are as follows:
1997:
1998:

$314,219
$550,061

1999:

$806,415

5 1 I iabilities foi i en lediatioi i are not contained in the Bacchus Works financial
statements but are booked at the corporate level and are contained in the annual reports of the year
- \H;U l o i n .

' .

55. The remediation and monitoring costs are included in Alliant's costs submitted to
the United States Government. The costs have been considered an allowable indirect contract cost
and have been i eii nbi irsed by tl le United States Government.
56. As part of the sale transaction, Alliant and Hercules, Inc. entered into an
Environmental Agreement. wmcji pu'viuc:-. I<A niucmniiK^u-::

*. :..-• i--\ •!•-- •.•<

T1'---

: >ivd f it'-itr-s Government does not reimburse Alliant for remediation costs.
57. The Alliant Annual Reports to Shareholders for 1998 states thai .A^ani has a
reimbursement receivable foi en\ ii oni nental costs reported *
-12-

-•: •>>.*• •'

': - •- r '"\ n 1
U U L ^ I *•

Appeal 1 Jo. 99-0190

which the report states it is expected that a significant portion of the company's environmental costs
will be i eirnbi used to the company by the I Ji lited States Govern ment and those not covered through
government contracts will be covered by Hercules under the indemnification agreement subject to
the company notifying Hercules <•; ^uinis pnoi
5'

'

A- A I ^ . L

. • uno

,>K...L _ W

V • - *. 1 " .• ^.)l(i- i;,: !*>% tin mi u 1999 and the year 2000 formlO-K

contain similar representations regarding indemnification and reimbursement.
JV

... i.; j i J i i . ; , ) . ^ ! ^ ; ' ^ ' ' ! ! ! ' ; ; ! ^ pr ai s e d 11 I e 1 ai i d a s p ai t c f hi s co st appi o ach,

determined based on the annual reports to shareholders, the environmental agreement, the contracts
which provide for indemnification and the fact that Alliant has been reimbursed by the United States
Governn lei it f oi t! ic remediatioi I costs, it lat th si = is i IC i let liability to A Uiant witl :i respect to
environmental contamination at the Bacchus facilities. Therefore, Mr. Cook made no deduction
from the land value or total property value IOI contamination remedy, m or i nonitoi ii ig.
60. Mr. Reilly disagreed with Mr. Cook. The view of Mr. Reilly is that the contracts,
including Aliiant's contracts with the government, and its indemnification agreement win. I k:rcujes,
pro v'ide that:"""! ; Vlliant has to ex.1 laust all othei potential i emedies before it can go back to I Jcrci lies and
then can only effectively get remedies from Hercules through litigation." Testimony of Robert
Reiih. ti w! *-i'i

.-i; Jvui,} s ksumony was that Amaru. cunu.-.L "

I,ill iiih1 tliffcrrnl

categoric litre's the fixed fee type of contract, there's the totally cost reimbursed type of contract,
there's the cost plus contract." Id. at 268-271. Under these contracts, Mr. Reilly states Aliiant's
recovery of its costs incurreu io: en. ;:-• :.,

:

\; n., .'

•'"* :\

'- t.

61. Mr. Reilly further testified that Mr. Cook's representations about Aliiant's
-13-
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potential reimbursement and/or indemnity for environmental costs are not relevant because the "new
buyer [the willing buyer under Utah law] would most likely not get the likkmniiica :i*;
)najmhi...i::,uji *; -

: :.i.- ;_.

*

V. • . '

-* testified that

indemnification and reimbursement are not relevant to the valuation of the land, because "if you
value the property - if you value the site as if vacant and unimproved, men > *« iki\ v.
ei :i viriroiii nental liabilities and yoi 11 ia/\ ?e to take 01 it stign ia " "1 1 at 1169.
62. After reviewing the testimony, the Commission finds there is some evidence of
contamination, bi it it is insufficient to quantify the decrement ii 1 \ all :ie tl lat I las occi H red because oi
si id 1 coi itan lination.
63.

The highest and best use of the property is as a rocket manufacturing pl-.m. u,sJ

fi iti 11 e pi irchasers of tl ie pi operty vv 01 aid likely contim le to 1 ise it as a rocket manufacturing plant. It is
probable that the federal government will continue to reimburse Alliant for the necessary and
allowable remediation and monitoring expenses.
64. I he evidence is unclear from the record what obligations the federal government
would have to continue making those reimbursements for monitoring if Alliant did not continue to
owi 1 the pi opei ty , pai tici :ilai ly if tl lere wei e 1 lot any goven lmei it cc i iti acts for productions on the
property.
65.. It is not clear from the evidence that the Resource Consen ulion and Rcccn ny
Ar f 1 U( 'P Al eoiiYcti\r* aotiou const nf order between Hercules, Inc., and the State of Utah runs with
the land and would be binding on any future owners of the land.

-14U
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66. Because of the reimbursement of all remediation and monitoring costs; the lack
of evidence to si 10 w whether tl le consent order i uns witl 1 tl :ie land; ai id the diffic ^ ilt> ii i qi :iai itify ii lg
any contamination, the Commission concludes Petitioner failed to meet its burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that there should be a decrement in the land values for contamination
i e:i nediation and/or i nonit :)i ing.
STIGMA
67. Petitioner also proposed an adjustment to the RCNLD values for "stigma". This
proposed ad ji istn lei it is to attei :i lpt to qi lantify a i edi ictioi :i. ii I vain le becai ise of a i legative impi essioi I
c-f the property created by the contamination. This negative impression may make it more diflic uh "• i
sell the property, whic;. A ^A-J extend the time necessary for any sale to occur,,,
6$. Mr. ReillvV proposed deduction for stigma is based upon the additional time, an
additional two to three years, to sell contaminated property. "If you assume that the willing buyer w riling sell M
: wcit ild i > : 11 ecen 'e the pi oceeds of the sale foi ai i additioi :ial two oi s :> years at that i :i :d
ten and a half discount rate, the reduction in the present value of the proceeds is about 2.3, 2.4
tail lion in 1 'r'. nasedupon a site value oi i J . \ " iii.i.x .;." fhe same methodology was used i or other
years.
69. Mr. Cook's position on stigma is that consideration of eight factors lead him to
'

i

jii.

:

•

•;

• •

, i . .

t, .

v

• ......

,; -iv

* ..

include: unknown remediation costs, fiiture liability, fmanceability restrictions, replaceability,
marketing perception and increased marketing tunc. Mr. L ook ; trriiicj testified these factors played
i io role in redi icing AJliai it's lai id vali le foi stigi na because "'of tl le fact that the government is very
-15-- •-
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much a part of the reimbursement program, [and because] there is an indemnification with Hercules
as a hatk up "" 'I i >i( / IK.
70. There is evidence that some contamination may exist on this property, but there is
no evidence that it would affect the purchase price of the property. Petitioner purchased this property
from I lei cules, ft ic 3 c i ily a fe w yeai s ago, ai id tl :iei e is no evidei ice tl :iat any si icl i "stigi na" either
delayed the closing on the property or that the price paid was reduced. Therefore, Petitioner has
failed to meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of Uic e\kk\,ee uiai ncre :-.m.'U;.: ;-._ n
decremei it ii 1 tl :ie lai id ' >ah les for "stigma"
FUNCTIONAL OBSOLESCENCE
"' 1

i L-S|K\

'

.••!•.,:

e, the parties agree tl lat "fi 11 ictional

obsolescence [is] the reduction in value (1) of real estate (and specifically land improvements and
buildings); and (2) of tangible personal property due to its inability to perform the function, (or yield
t

.

d'.-iinuiir.1

. ,

n

V Uu!h-2 at 7. Functional obsolescence is in

addition to depreciation, which is a loss in value caused by physical wear and tear.

are considered separately and are not included in the Marshall Valuation Service Cost Manual tables.
Cook Appraisal at 48, Exh. R-3.
73

•

• MI-M-M.

"' "

! ^ L - d $18,650,000 for 1997;

$19,290,000 for 1998; and $19,600,000 for 1999 from the stipulated RCNLD. Exhibit P-Reilly-3,
Exhibit A (Revised).
;>• -''cr Weir IV.rort of March 10,2000. was prepared by an Alliant employee
-16-
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for purposes of maintaining records of the use of the buildings for submittal to the United States
Government P. Cook Tr. April 26; 2001, at 766-67.

2 (attachment).
76. Mi Weir categorized the buildings into three categories: buildings which are
gcr^r*'

•

•

!*. h have been placed on

stand-by for possible future use; and buildings which have been abandoned. Cook Appraisal at 49,
LXJ.

i

•».

77. In proposing his deduction from RCNLD for functional obsolescence, Mr. Reilly
made his own study similar to the Roger Weir Report and deducted the full value of the buildings
wl lich he determined were "r

-' ' '

id-d '* '

• - ' :". +

have either been placed on stand-1^ for possible future use. oi have been abandoned.
•i»K u . c.l '.:.L K o u c i V ^;i K c i ' / n i :•.!•: . ! ..i x

'

s!

* **

economic obsolescence. Mr. Cook's appraisal said, "in the case of either standby or abandoned
buildings which are still in use beyond a nominal level the reproduction or replacement cost new
figures 1 1a1 'e been reviewed If the> ai e ii I lii le 1 ( < itl :i tl ic costs of buildii igs that si ippoi t existing I ise,
no additional obsolescence is assessed. If the costs are measurably higher than would be expected
for use to which those improvements are now put, aaaniunai obsolescence is assessed ius^ i«•:
difference between reported costs new and a reasonable cost for the actual use."
79. After issuing his original appraisal, Mr. Cook made a physical inspection of the
property in September 2000. F ollowing that physical inspectioi I, 1 4i Cook, issi led *. .; . : lei ital
-17- •
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report in which he testified the functional obsolescence was $14,745,524 lor ] ' K ' ~ h>i;-.i. U..- ufor

80. One of the buildings Mr. Cook included as having taxable value was the NIROP
administration building which is "no longer used", which he said weir,, nave " -„di •* au,e , : s ...4
:

-

.:•:.- .-

• • *' .:iro-r-Mw. .7, •

' oh- MICC-between Mr.

Cook and Mr. Reilly is in this one building.
81

Fhe expert witnesses i or both parties agree theie ].- ..=::..: • -

OLN.-;

:*

inlmerous buildings located on the property. There was general, though not complete, agreement on
\- liiv-h buildings were partially or fully functionally obsolete. Mr. Reilly deducted the full value of
;. \)M v . •

c • I: i is ed oi nc ti ieededM, whereas 1\ Ir. Cook left some "si lell vah ie" foi soi i ie

of those buildings.
82. 1 ii I lei.ll> provided a complete list and \ allies of ti ie buildii lgs vvl iicll; I 1 ie
determined were functionally obsolete because they were "not used or not needed", whereas Mr.
Cook did not have with him, and did not provide, the list and values of the buildings he determined
\ vei epai daily oi fi iH> fi u lctioi mil;} obsolete rherefore the Coi i u i rissic n coi lid i ic treview , evah late
and compare the buildings on Mr. Cook's list to the buildings on NIr. Reilly's list to determine
whether or not the iiKaiSa^ oi a .with \ a;uc is appropriate.
83.

The Commission concludes that Petitioner met its burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence that the buildings on the list of Mr. Reilly were functionally obsolete,
and the values thereol should be removed lioin llii- lnKil valine m ilk ainwiml proposed 1", I li
Reilly. By making this determination, the Commission is not making a finding or determination that
-18-
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j \ j ' 'cii:

i,

' '

'

all buildings that are "not used or not needed" do not have value.
ECONOMIC OBSOLESCENCE
84. Economic obsolescence is generally defined as "a reduction in the value of real
estate improvements and of tangible personal property due to the impact of economic conditions that
ai e exteri :ial to a:i id i ic t coi iti oiled b> tl le pi lysical i ia/tt 11 e 01 ti le sti i ictit iral or mecl ia.1 lical opei atioi i ai"
the property." Exhibit P-Reilly-3 at 9, and Resp. Exhibit 3 at 53, quoting "The Appraisal of Real
Estate", page 392 (11 ed.). Further, there are two general methodologies by which economic
obsolescence is measi ired

"I he fii st i i letl lod is a "paired data anah - sis" by v ;rl licl I • ai le property

without any economic obsolescence is compared to another piopcrtv that suffers from economic
obsolescence.

I he second is a ''capitalization • : :ua .

: .!....que by which economic

obsolescence is the quantifiable difference in the capitalized rent between the property when there is
little or no economic obsolescence and another property which suffers from economic obsolescence.
<:"

-'i"

-

1:1 iat

!s

lliant's Bacchi is Wc i I as n lay 1 \i 'e si iffered soi i le

economic obsolescence although Respondent has argued that the economic obsolescence, if any, is
minimal, 1 lie primary issue is how to measure and quantify that economic obsolescence, and it is
the largest issue in this proceeding.
86. Petitioner has submitted that economic obsolescence should be measured and
ded'i icted froi n R CNI D based I ipe i i the i edlxa * - ii :ig reasons:
a. The strategic solid rocket motor market is declining. Estimated industry
sales in 1991 were approximately $2.5 billioi i, which i ell to

-19- •

future.
b

V. lien the Bacchus \\ oiks wits oiigwdlh uiiistttRfal i Hen lilr*; ji \\;\ ,
built, to manufacture large rocket motors such as the space shuttle
boosters. The plant has not operated at peak production capacity because
(l)Petitioi lei vv as:i lot si iccessfiil in getting soi ne expected coi ltracts si id i
as a second source shuttle contract; (2) the government missile business
declined; and (3) much of the current business is e x p e n d ,c .,iu:.;h
\ ehicle (EI *\r) bi isii less which are si nailer products than that for which
the facility was originally built.

c, W hen Bacchus W est was initially coi isti \ icted, it w as n itendedto pi odi ice
large-scale rocket motors up to ten (10) feet in diameter, such as the
space shuttle. Tr. 37.
d

Alln tlI* Co\\\ W;n (Mint* l<> an mil HI I%)(| several missile programs
were cancelled and the missile business has significantly declined, Tr.
38.

e. 1lie space shuttle launch rates are only approximately one-third of what
was originally planned when Bacchus West was constructed
i

i

1 he ' nh 1 pHijnihi* i-ji mdii.'-trv wi^ ;ttlvtTM*K nffeoted when Alliant was
not selected to continue development of the evolved expendable launch
vehicle system (EELV),

W<V.K:

.: •• > .

ropellant, aiu.

companies (Boeing and I <
• -'1 1- -H-Ylrirtm; were selected to continue
-20-
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EELV development using liquid propulsion systems. Tr. 40-42
g. Son ic R i issian tecl :i nology has i eplaced sc i i le of the • I Jnited States
Technolni"-' '11. 42-43.
h. The bidding on projects has gone from government supported cost-plus
proya,

.-.

• -..' ]

•

• :

:*

:

87. Based upon these reasons, Mr. Reilly, on Schedule I of Exhibit 3-Reilly, used
several economic indicators and compared the information for the years at issue (1997, 1998 and
1999) v - itl :i; i base pern xi < xf 1984 iLhi < :>i; l g l i 1990.
88. Respondent argues there is very little justification for an economic obsolescence
adjustment because of :iu ;, -.owing:
a. Prior to the purchase of the Bacchus Works facility from Hercules,
Alliant retained Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., which reported that

decline, bin wil- renwnn viable for the foreseeable future. Although the
industi y is likely to'consolidate to some extent, Hercules' market position
appears to be strong and they will likely be a long term survivor." BoozAllen Report at 12-12-13,"Exh. R-63, AT005382-83. Based on that
repoi t ai :t :! ft if thei ^ /ah latic i i,

' llis i it belie1 eel it cc i lid inci ease

shareholder value with the purchase. Shareholder Report, Exh. R-25 at
JD.

b

' ii es ^i i laly tics. another c oi ISI iltant to A Ilk n it at tl le time of purchase,
-21-
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predicted that "both HAC and Thiokol Corporation ("Thiokol") should
survive tl le growing competition ana v ^--.m. JLU;. -.-merge a :./ .
U.S. producers of large solid rocket motors." Shareholder Report at 32,
Exh. R-25
c

/ Iliarit 1 : i ie\ v of the potei itial i legati ve i:i lfluences existing ii i tl :ie i i :iai 1 ;:et
before it decided to purchase Hercules Aerospace. The Aires Report
stated that "budget constraints will probably prevent the U.S. Government
fi on I begii ii lii ig any i iew lai ii id :t dei,relopi i iei ltprograi i is tl lat coi ikl affect,
within the next 10 years, the market for large solid rocket motors."
Sharejiukier Kcpv>i! a I J~. ^mmair., v. •,.

nan: ]x.;ei-asec : I. a it was

aware that the "demand for unmanned launches by the . . . Iitan IV,
which uses HAC boosters, will be significantly reduced." lJ
d

A

llianti ecei ved its largest solid rod :et i

T

"i ".:

:* ; • • ry when

it was awarded a $750 Million contract to produce solid rocket motors for
Boeing's Delta launeli \elii^ie m luvcs. MIK. IIK-^,,-isnioii. Ainani aiso
increased its share of the I itan solid rocket motor upgrade (SRMU)
market by wanning the entire Titan SRMU business from a competitor,
Chemical System!' Dnisiun. Shareholder R'pnrf a! I0\
e. John M. Logsdon, III, Director of the Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University, and a leading expert in the space field, reports

-22-
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solid rocket motors for expendable launch vehicle." Report at 1, Exh. R24.
f.

Alliant aerospace management reported to Alliant's Board of Directors in
1998 that it had 70% of the ELV solid rocket motor market. Logsdon's
report shows a steady increase in the numbers of ELV launches since the
mid 1980's. Jeff Foote, President of Aerospace Propulsion of Alliant.
stated that Alliant has a contract w i.ii toeing to produce 1 ••• ;JLK.< . •
motors, the latest entry into the EELV market. Foote Dep. at 16-17.
Affirming this outlook in 1999, Alliant's aerospace management reported
to its Board of Directors that 1999 "has been an excellent year." Exh. R11.

. g. The number of expendable launch vehicle launches has increased from
1984 to 1999. Those during 1984 to 1990 average 11.5 launches per year
and are as follows:

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Total:

h

16
8
4
8
10
13
2J.
80

number oi lunacies of expendable lau;.^n . envies ic: . !vt-i • 6;
1997 is 30; 1998 is 26; 1999 is 30. Logsdon Tr. April 25, 2001 at 586.
-23•
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i.

Booz-Allen& Hamilton projected 1995 to 1999 total sales for the Trident
strategic missile to be $325 million. Actual sales for the first five years
were $336.5 million, which equates to 107.3% of projection. Cook Tr.
April 26, 2001 at 805-806, Exh. R-97.

j.

Space sales were projected at $909 million dollars for 1995 to 1999, but
actual sales were $1,225 billion dollars or 140% of the projection. The
combined sales projection for 1995 to 1999 was $1,234 billion dollars
and the actual sales were $1.622 billion dollars, or 131.5% of projection.
Cook Tr. April 26, 2001 at 806, Exh. R-97.

k. Petitioner is the leading supplier for solid rocket motors (SRM) for U.S.
manufactured expendable launch vehicles, supplying SRM's for five of
the nine ELV's in current use — Titan IV, Delta II, Delta III, Pegasus and
Taurus. (Other U.S. ELV's in current use are the Atlas II and Atlas III,
Athena and Titan II.) In addition, Alliant will supply SRM's for some
models of the Delta IV family of EELV's which are scheduled to enter
service in 2001. Logsdon Report at 1, Exh. R-24.
1. Those EELV's which use Alliant solids have accounted for most of the
U.S. ELV launches in recent years. Projected launches for CY 2001-2002
include 17 Delta II launches, six Delta III launches, the first launch of
Delta IV, four Titan IV launches, four Pegasus launches, and one Taurus
launch (with only six Atlas launches and one Titan II launch scheduled
-24-
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during the same period among the other ELV's.) Logsdon Report at 1,
Exh. R-24.
m. The percentage of ELV launches using Alliant solid rocket motors was
60% in 1997, 72% in 1998, and 70% in 1999.
n. Alliant provides solid rocket motors for all three launch vehicle markets,
i.e., heavy, medium and light,
o. Since Alliant purchased Hercules, a commercial market has emerged for
both commercial and governmental users for solid rocket motor strap-ons.
p. For 1996, 1997 and 1998, Delta II launches have exceeded the Aires
Analytics projection. Delta III and IV are new launch vehicles for which
Alliant provides some or all of the solid rocket motor, which were not
anticipated at the time of the acquisition of Hercules,
q. The decline in the rate of worldwide expendable launch vehicle launches
is due solely to the decline in the Soviet and Russian space captive
market. Logsdon Tr. April 25, 2001 at 563.
r. Although the decline of Communism and the cold war did result in a
reduction in demand for strategic and tactical missiles, it had very little
impact on the space market,
s. The facilities at Bacchus West were built to manufacture solid rocket
motors for the Trident II, the Titan IV B, the Delta and the Pegasus and
all of these programs continued through 1999. NASA's budget has not
-25*J u L 0 a '}
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been cut and was essentially flat during the years in question. NASA's
projects have not been scaled down or functions reduced. Logsdon Tr.
April 25, 2001 at 568-571.
89. If the measure of any economic obsolescence is to be the "capitalized rent loss",
the parties strongly disagree over the "benchmark" from which to measure such loss. Petitioner
argues the loss should be measured from the time most of the Bacchus West plant was built from
1984 to 1990, and it should be based upon the present unused capacity of the property
90. Mr. Reilly, for Petitioner, measures economic obsolescence at Bacchus Works by
comparing (1) historical Bacchus Works' results of operations vs. current results of operations; (2)
Bacchus Works' capital appropriation requests vs. actual financial performance; (3) projected
Bacchus Works' financial performance vs. actual financial performance; (4) required Bacchus Works'
cost of capital vs. actual return on invested capital; (5) projected Bacchus Works' internal rate of
return vs. actual rate of return; and (6) industry demand analysis. Exh. P-Reilly-3, p. 78, Schedule 1.
91. To determine these measures, Mr. Reilly adjusted the financial statements for
Bacchus Works operations provided by Alliant to (1) exclude the results of the Hercules fiber plant,
a property that was not purchased by Alliant; (2) exclude accounts payable, as the account payable
balance was inconsistently accounted for between Bacchus Works and its parent company
throughout the historical period analyzed; and (3) re-classified certain expenditures as "fixed assets"
that were previously classified as "other assets".
92. Based on that analysis, Mr. Reilly concluded the economic obsolescence for the
years in question was 50% for 1997, 55% for 1998, and 45% for 1999. Exhibit P-Reilly-3 p. 78,
-26-
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Schedule 1.
93. On the other hand, Respondent argues that any loss should be measured only
from the time Petitioner purchased the property from Hercules, and should be based only on any
reductions in value occurring after the date of purchase by Petitioner. The position of Respondent is
that any economic obsolescence suffered by Petitioner should be based upon its own purchase price
for the property, and other financial data, and not on the amount paid by Hercules to construct or
acquire the property approximately fifteen (15) years prior to the lien dates.
94. Mr. Cook, for Respondent, maintains that a proper benchmark for measuring
economic obsolescence, which is similar to a paired sales analysis, is the allocation of the purchase
price of the Bacchus Works from Hercules by Alliant, and comparing that to the values determined
using the cost approach.

Mr. Cook compared his preliminary cost values (reproduction

cost/replacement cost new less normal depreciation, less extraordinary functional obsolescence, plus
land and personal property at Bacchus Works and Clearfield) to the allocated sale price of Bacchus
Works. Based upon that analysis, Mr. Cook concluded there was little or no economic obsolescence
for the years 1997 to 1999 as is reflected in the following table.
1997

1998

1999

Subject Purchase Price Analysis
Allocated Purchase Price
347,300,000 347,300,000
Preliminary Cost Values
335,199,904 364,199,583
Difference (Possible Obsolescence)
0 - 16,899,583
Difference Expressed as a Percent 0.00%
4.64%

347,300,000
337,768,315
0
0.00%

Cook Appraisal at 94, Exh. R-3; Cook Supp. at 14, Exh. R-4
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95. Mr. Cook also attempted to measure economic obsolescence by calculating a
return on property, plant and machinery (PP&M) and estimated the range of economic'obsolescence.
The low end of economic obsolescence based upon a return on PP&M would be no obsolescence for
1997,1998 or 1999. The high end of economic obsolescence based upon that calculation would be
$10,844,523 for 1997, $4,806,525 for 1998, and zero for 1999. Mr. Cook's final conclusion of
economic obsolescence is $5,700,000 for 1997, $16,900,000 for 1998, and zero for 1999. Cook
Supp. at 14, Exhibit R-4.
96. The primary method Mr Cook used to determine economic obsolescence was to
allocate the total purchase price to the Bacchus West facility, and comparing that allocated purchase
price with his cost values, and the difference is his possible obsolescence. Mr. Cook testified that a
purchase price analysis would indicate economic obsolescence of approximately $16,900,000 for
1998, but zero for both 1997 and 1999.
97. Mr. Cook also made an analysis of earnings before income taxes (EBIT) and
earnings before income taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITIDA), and arrived at a low end
and high end of economic obsolescence. The low end was zero for all three years, and the high end
was $10,844,523 for 1997, $4,806,525 for 1998, and zero for 1999.
98.

Based upon his analysis, Mr. Cook made a final estimate of economic

obsolescence of $5,700,000 for 1997, $16,900,000 for 1998, and zero for 1999.
99. The Commission determines that although the property may have some economic
obsolescence, the amounts recommended by Mr. Reilly are excessive and would not result in an
accurate representation of the fair market value of the property. This determination is made in part
-28-
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for the following reasons:
a. In Exhibit IV-1, p. 83 to Exhibit 3-Reilly, his "Historical Results of
Operations vs. Current Results of Operations" analysis, Mr. Reilly bases
part of his proposed economic obsolescence adjustment on data that is
relatively meaningless. He began by using historical return on net
tangible assets (RONTA) that begins in 1984, prior to the construction of
any of the assets now on the books of the company. Virtually all of the
income in 1984 was earned on assets from NIROP, and those assets were
not on the books of either Petitioner or Hercules. In addition, many of the
assets from Plant 1 were nearly fully depreciated, so the return on assets
is not meaningful. Therefore, notwithstanding Mr. Reilly's testimony that
a 170% return on assets "was normal for 1984", (Tr. 457-458) the
Commission finds it was not a normal return on net tangible assets, and it
does not provide a basis upon which economic obsolescence should be
calculated.
b. All of the calculations used by Mr. Reilly on Exhibit IV-1, p. 83 to
Exhibit 3-Reilly begin very high for 1984, and then rapidly decline. We
find the rates of return on which Reilly based his economic obsolescence
calcluations did not begin to stabilize until 1988. The use of 1984 to
1987 accordingly distorts his base period calculation If Mr. Reilly's
method of calculating economic obsolescence is used with 1988 as the
-29-
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initial year, it results in no economic obsolescence.
c. Mr. Reilly's calculations of return on total assets and return on equity are
both tainted and distorted by a $120,000,000 adjustment Mr. Reilly made
for a litigation settlement amount received from Lockheed-Martin. Mr.
Reilly acknowledged that effect. (Tr. 329, 331, 335 and 336).
d. Mr. Reilly demonstrated a decline in the military missile market, but he
failed to take into consideration the increase in the commercial satellite
launch business, thereby significantly overstating the amount of economic
obsolescence.
100. The Commission likewise has difficulty accepting in full the .economic
obsolescence methodology applied by Mr. Cook for the following reasons:
a. The Commission is not fully comfortable with the measurement of
economic obsolescence made by Mr. Cook based upon an allocation of
the purchase price in this case. The purchase price by Alliant from
Hercules involved property in multiple states and multiple counties in this
state. Mr. Cook made a good faith effort to allocate a portion of the
purchase price to the property in Salt Lake County. That process required
making numerous assumptions, and while most of the assumptions
appear to be reasonable, they are still somewhat speculative. A change in
any of those assumptions could make a substantial difference in the
ultimate conclusion. The Commission finds that the assumptions made in
-30-
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making an estimate of economic obsolescence by Mr. Cook using an
allocation of the purchase price were not fully supported. The purchase
price allocation method is not a true "paired data analysis". Rather, it
combines elements of a comparable sales approach with a cost approach.
Although this method may indicate the existence of obsolescence, it does
not provide a reliable measure of that obsolescence.
b. The Commission finds that Mr. Cook's "Capitalization Rate Analysis"
amounts to a comparison of income approach conclusions of value with
the preliminary cost figures. It is not a true "capitalized rent loss"
methodology.

As is the case with the allocated purchase price

methodology, this technique appears to compare two approaches; the
income capitalization approach and the cost approach. Although Mr.
Cook compares capitalization rates as a measure, capitalizing the income
at his "target rate" and allocating any difference to his cost figures can
achieve the exact same results. However, as with his sales allocation
method, Mr. Cook's "capitalization rate analysis" appears to be a
reasonable technique for identifying the possible existence of economic
obsolescence.
c. With respect to the other financial analyses made by Mr. Cook, the
Commission finds there is not adequate foundation and support for his
rates of return, debt rate, gross margin, and other general measures of
-31-
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relative performance determinations to conclude that they relate to
economic obsolescence. These are more indicative of how the going
concern is performing relative to expectations or other elements of
Petitioner's business, rather than whether the physical assets suffer from
economic obsolescence.
101. The Commission therefore finds that Mr. Cook's appraisal substantiates the
existence of economic obsolescence in at least the amounts stated in his report.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just administration of property
taxes to ensure that property is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. Utah Code
Ann. §59-1-210(7).
2. To prevail, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County's original
assessment contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for
reducing the original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson V Bd Of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997). Utah Power & Light Co v Utah State Tax
Commission, 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 1979). However, in this case neither party presented evidence to
support the determination of value made by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
Accordingly, each party has the burden of proof to provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary
basis, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the fair market value of the property. Once
the parties stipulated to the initial land and facility values, either party desiring to increase or
decrease those values must provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis by a
-32U O L i) o i
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decrease those values must provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis by a
preponderance of the evidence, for any proposed modifications from those stipulated amounts.
3. A tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person
or any real or personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is used
in connection with a business conducted for profit. This includes property which is owned by the
United States Government but used in connection with a business conducted for profit. Utah Code
Ann. §59-4-101.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that the NIROP plant is not exempt and is subject to the privilege tax
imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et. seq. The NIROP property is used in connection with a
business conducted for profit, and the lease and contract entitle Petitioner to exclusive possession of
the premises.
We have previously addressed Petitioner's NIROP arguments in the context of an earlier case
that is now on appeal in District Court. We believe that decision is correct and reaffirm it here.
First, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioner is enjoying the beneficial use of the NIROP
facilities in connection with a business being conducted for profit. Accordingly, under Section 59-4103(l)(a), that beneficial use is subject to the privilege tax, unless one of the exceptions in (l)(b) or
(c) applies. There is no allegation that either of the exceptions applies.
Petitioner does argue, however, that it is exempt from the privilege tax under Section 59-4103(3)(e). That section provides that no privilege tax is imposed on the use or possession of
property pursuant to a lease, permit, or easement, unless the lease, permit or easement entitles the
-33-
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lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the property. First, it is not clear that the contractual
arrangement between the Navy and NIROP is a lease, permit or easement It certainly is not a lease
or an easement in the classic sense.
Even if the contract constitutes a permit, however, we do not believe the supervisory
activities of the Navy can be said to interfere with Alliant's exclusive possession of the premises.
There is no indication in the record that the Navy's presence here is different than the government
oversight provided in federal defense procurement projects generally. It is our understanding that
such procurement contracts were a significant factor in motivating Utah, as well as most other states,
to adopt the privilege tax in the first place. We believe that this type of contract is exactly a situation
that the privilege tax was intended to reach. See generally Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 393
P.2d 391 (1964). The oversight by Lockheed and Boeing was not such as to interfere with Alliant's
exclusive possession.

Lockheed and Boeing were there to facilitate and supervise Alliant's

fulfillment of its own duties under the contract. Although they had a right to enter the property,
neither Boeing nor Lockheedjiad^ny right to possession of the property that in any way diminished^
Alliant's interest. Accordingly, we believe that Alliant's use of the NIROP property during the years,
in issue is properly subject to tax ,
We also conclude that the stipulations of the parties regarding the land values and
facilities values are a reasonable fair market value of the property of Petitioner, except for any
possible considerations for contamination, stigma, functional obsolescence, and economic (or
external) obsolescence. However, we do conclude there is insufficient evidence to establish there
should be a decrement in value for either contamination or stigma, but there should be a decrement
-34-
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in value for functional obsolescence as set forth herein.
In addition, we conclude that the Bacchus Works suffers from economic
obsolescence. Both appraisers reported economic obsolescence in their appraisals. However, neither
appraiser has given us a completely reliable basis for estimating that obsolescence. As noted above,
we fincLthat Mr. Reilly's methodology clearly overstates economic obsolescence. Although we do
not agree with Mr. Cook's specific methodology, we find that his conclusions at least provide a
floor All of the evidence indicates there is economic obsolescence in 1997 and 1998, of at least the
amount determined by Mr. Cook. Therefore, we find economic obsolescence of $5,700,000 for 1997
and $16,900,000 for 1998, and zero for 1999.

-35-
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The fair market value of the property should therefore by calculated as follows:
1997

1998

1999

$ 35,545,692
0
0
$ 35,545,692

$ 39,322,360
0
0
$ 39,322,360

$ 41,052,358
0
0
$ 41,052,358

PLANT 1

$ 61,767,570

$ 63,263,144

$ 63,538,813

NIROP

$ 38,082,662

$ 38,676,540

$ 38,669,210

BACCHUS WEST
SUBTOTAL

$104,163,666
$204,013,898

$ 106,633.254
$208,572,938

$ 107,508.194
$209,716,217

Deletions

$

$

$

Additions

$

$

TOTAL FACILITY
Total Land and Facility
Functional Obsolescence

$204,013,898
$239,559,590
$ 18,650,000

$ 209.386,474
$ 248,708,834
$ 19,250,000

$211.197.526
$ 252,249,884
$ 19,600,000

Sub-total

$ 220,909,590

$ 229,458,834

$ 232,649,884

Economic Obsolescence

$ 5,700,000
$215.209.590

$ 16,900,000
$ 212.558.834

$
0
$ 232.649.884

$215.210.000

$212.559.000

$232.650.000

Land Values (per Stipulation)
Contamination
Stigma
Total Land Values
FACILITY

Fair Market Value
Rounded
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813,536

$

1,481,309
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DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the market value of the
subject property is $215,210,000 for 1997, $212,559,000 for 1998, and $232,650,000 for 1999. The
Commission further determines the NIROP property is not exempt and is subject to the taxes
imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et. seq. It is so ordered.
DATED this

//3

day of

Afptf/m//CA

f

. 2001

G. Blaine Davis
Administrative Law Judge

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION:
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision.
DATED this

f&

day of

Autff/rn/uA/

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

2001.

Commissioner

IfillMA^W fe<JU^

'JU*^

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

Marc B. Johns
Commission

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l 3. A Request
for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do notfilea
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutesfinalagency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.
GBD/ssw/99-0190fof
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

ORDER ON JOINT MOTION FOR
APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

Petitioner,
Consolidated Appeal Nos.
99-0910, 98-0608 and 98-0452
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Account No. 2015400008
Tax Type:

County-Assessed Property

Judge:

Davis

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Commission for hearing on the Joint Motion for
Approval of Settlement on March 1, 2001. G. Blaine Davis presided, together with Pam
Hendrickson, Commission Chair, R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner, Palmer DePaulis,
Commissioner, and Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner. Petitioner was represented by Mr. Maxwell
A. Miller and Mr. Randy M. Grimshaw, from the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer.
Respondent, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, was represented by Mr. J. Craig Smith, from
the law firm of Nielsen & Senior, P.C. Intervenor, Lee Gardner, Salt Lake County Assessor, was
represented by Mr. Kelly W. Wright, Attorney at Law. Intervenor, Board of Education of Granite
School District, was represented by Mr. John E.S. Robson, from the law firm of Fabian and
Clendenin.
The relevant facts upon which the Commission has based this Order are:
1. The above-referenced consolidated appeals involve property owned, leased or used
by Alliant. Alliant has challenged the Salt Lake County Assessor's valuation of its property for

y j

J.

o -
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1995,1996,1997, 1998 and 1999. This Commission has previously ruled on Alliant's real property
for tax years 1995 and 1996 and Alliant has challenged that decision in District Court. Alliant's
personal property for 1995 and 1996 is still before this Commission.
2. Alliant timely appealed the Assessor's respective assessments for real and personal
property for 1997, 1998 and 1999 to the County Board of Equalization. To facilitate the resolution
of those appeals, the parties stipulated to a decision by the County Board of Equalization adverse
to Alliant and upholding the Assessor's original assessments.
3. All appeals currently before the Tax Commission have been consolidated into this
proceeding.
4. By a scheduling Order dated March 8, 2000, a formal hearing on the real and
personal property tax issues was set for November 2000. Subsequently, the County Board of
Equalization and Alliant stipulated to a continuance of the hearing until April 2001 for the purpose
of discussing settlement.
5. On November 17, 2000, the Board of Education of Granite School District, filed
with the Utah State Tax Commission its Petition to Intervene.
6. On or about December 5, 2000, Alliant and the County Board of Equalization
agreed to settle their dispute of the foregoing matters. The terms of the settlement are contained in
a letter dated December 5, 2000 (the "Settlement") from the attorneys for the County Board of
Equalization to Alliant's counsel.
7.

In a Commission meeting on December 6, 2000, the Salt Lake County

-2UKi
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Commission voted to authorize the settlement outlined in the letters exchanged between the parties.
8. On December 13, 2000, Mr. Lee Gardner, Salt Lake County Assessor, filed with
the Utah State Tax Commission his Petition to Intervene.
9. On December 15, 2000, Alliant and the County Board of Equalization filed a
"Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving
Settlement'1 with this Commission.
10. Under the terms of the Settlement, to resolve all Alliant claims for tax years 1995
through 1999, the County Board of Equalization agreed to refund five million dollars ($5,000,000)
to Alliant.
11. Under the terms of the Settlement, "[n]o obsolescence percentage or amount
[was] applied to any particular year under appeal and any allocation of a reduction in value to any
particular year shall be for refund calculation percentages only and shall be neither indicative or
dispositive with respect to any issue raised in Alliant's appeals."
12. The Settlement was conditioned upon "final approval by the Utah State Tax
Commission and the District Court and entry of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to
authorize Salt Lake County and the affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover all
refunds paid through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy."
13. Granite School District is the single largest recipient of the property tax revenue
that was the subject of the dispute and would be responsible for approximately fifty percent of the
refund, or about $2.5 million.

-3-
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14.

On January 29, 2001, the Utah State Tax Commission issued an Order

authorizing the Board of Education for Granite School District and Mr. Lee Gardner, Salt Lake
County Assessor, to intervene and become parties to the action.
The parties have presented written briefs, memorandums, and oral arguments. The
Parties have also presented numerous issues, arguments and legal authorities to support either
approving or rejecting the proposed settlement.
Based upon the foregoing facts presented to the Commission, and the briefs,
memorandums, and oral arguments presented to the Commission, it is hereby determined as follows:
1. The Petition to Intervene filed by the Board of Education of Granite School
District was filed with the Utah State Tax Commission on November 17, 2000.
2. During the time Alliant Techsystems and me Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization were negotiating a possible stipulated settlement of the cases before this Commission,
they were each aware that Granite School District had a substantial financial interest in any
resolution of those cases and had requested to be made a party so it could fully participate in the
resolution of those cases.
3. After the Petition to Intervene filed by Granite School District was granted, it
became a necessary party to any stipulated settlement of the issues before the Commission. In the
interest of justice, and because Granite School District had done all it could to protect its rights, we
detemiine its status as a party should be effective as of November 17, 2000, the date of the Motion
to Intervene.

-4u u i d i- ^
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4. Under the circumstances here, this Commission determines it is not appropriate
to approve the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, because to do so would require a necessary
party that had moved to intervene prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such a settlement
against its will.
5. Because of the Commission's determination on this issue, it is not necessary for
the Commission to decide any of the other issues briefed and argued by the parties.
6. The Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement is denied. .
7. The Formal Hearing previously scheduled to commence April 23, 2001 will go
forward unless otherwise ordered.
DATED this

7

day of

^TTpLtcJl

, 2001.

G. Blaine Davis
Administrative Law Judge
BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision.
DATED this

7

day of

"^77^'tsf?

v/';><,i',-"ft<'S;,A,

Q

: "3 6

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

Si

atAL s

W

,2001.

/ :

R. Bruce Johnso
Commissioned/

<XL>

Marc B. Johpon
Commissioner

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner
GBD/ssw/99-09IO.ojm
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Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson, concurring.
I join in the decision above. For the reasons set out below, however, I feel it
appropriate to write a concurring opinion as well.
There is much to be said for the concept that a court should only decide the specific
case before it and should base that decision on the narrowest possible grounds. Judicial resources
are not expended unnecessarily and carefully tailored decisions result. As an administrative agency
with quasi-judicial powers, however, it may be appropriate for us to give more guidance to the
parties regularly appearing before us.
The Commission's opinion is based on our determination that we should not force
the District, having timely intervened, to accept a settlement against its will. Similar considerations,
however, should preclude the District from forcing the County Board of Equalization to litigate an
issue against the Board's better judgment. In my view, there is no public policy that would prevent
Alliant and the County from agi'eeing to a reasonable value for settlement purposes and calculating
a refund of a portion of the taxes paid to the County itself and all nonintervening entities based on
that settlement. Alliant would still be free to contest the Board of Equalization's original value for
purposes of obtaining a refund of taxes paid to the District, and the District would still be free to
defend the value for purposes of avoiding any such refund. Such a biflircated approach may or may
not be acceptable to Alliant. It is certainly not presented in the instant case. But I do not believe
such an approach should be precluded by our decision.

-6-
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With regard to the settlement that is before us, the Intervenors have strenuously
argued that this settlement is based only on a specific refund amount, not on the fair market value
of the Subject Property. Accordingly, it violates, in their view, the uniformity and fair market value
requirements of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution. Moreover, the Intervenors argue that the
amount of a refund (or additional tax payment) is not an issue for the Commission to decide. They
would argue that our role is only to determine fair market value; the amount of any refund or
additional payment is arguably beyond our jurisdiction.
This argument has caused the Commission serious concern. Our constitutional duty
to supervise and administer the tax laws of the state is broad, but not unlimited. We clearly do not
have jurisdiction over everything that relates to the payment or refund of property taxes. For
example, the Board of County Commissioners has discretion, in certain cases, to refund property
taxes that is reviewable only by a court, not this Commission. See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 870 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Nevertheless, I believe a refusal to
consider any settlement, because it is originally denominated in terms of tax dollars, rather than fair
market value, would constitute an unwarranted abdication of our responsibility.
Indeed, the judgment levy statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 59-1-1330, seems to approve such a
course. It provides in part that "[i]f the commission or a court of competent jurisdiction orders a
reduction in the amount of any tax levied against any property for tax purposes, the taxpayer shall
be reimbursed under Subsection (3)." It is hard to reconcile this language with the claim that the
Commission can never order (or approve) a refund of property taxes and is limited only to

-7-
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determinations of value.
This case, however,involves multiple years and jurisdiction over the matters in issue
is now divided between the Commission and the District Court. Accordingly, there must be some
allocation of value among those years. Indeed, the settlement agreement explicitly contemplates
such an allocation.
The evidence before us, primarily the minutes of the Board of County
Commissioners, indicate that valuation issues were of paramount concern to the Commissioners.
Those were also their concerns in their roles as members of the Board of Equalization. They
reviewed the appraisals, they came to their own conclusions about the relative merits of the
appraisals and the risks of litigation. Their failure to prescribe a specific dollar value for each year
before approving the settlement should not necessarily be fatal where qualified experts had widely
disparate views as to fair market value.
Unfortunately, at this point in time, there is still no allocation. Only one of the
parties, Alliant, has attempted to allocate the reduction among the years in issue. That allocation is
illustrative only. It does not purport to represent the agreement of the parties. Without such an
allocation, however, we have no way of evaluating the merits of the proposed settlement. In the
absence of intervention, this shortcoming could easily be remedied by allowing the County and
Alliant to agree on a specific allocation of values for the years in issue. Of course, any such
allocation is now moot, given our decision that Granite School District should not be forced to
accept a settlement against its will. Where there is no such allocation, this Commission cannot Icnow

-8-
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what it is approving in terms of market value or even how much of the settlement is still within its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, I concur in the decision not to approve the settlement.

R. Bruce JohnsoX/
Commissioner//
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Maxwell A. Miller
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main, Suite 1800
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Karl Hendrickson
Deputy District Attorney
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Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
Re-

settlement in Alliant Techsystems v. Salt Lake County BcL of
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Maxwell A. Miller
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art. XIII, § 8

(v) household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner of that property
in maintaining the owner's home.
(b) The exemption under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) shall
accrue to the benefit of the users of pumped water as
provided by statute.
(3) The following may be exempted from property tax as
provided by statute:
(a) property owned by a disabled person who, during
military training or a military conflict, was disabled in the
line of duty in the military service of the United States or
the State; and
(b) property owned by the unmarried surviving spouse
or the minor orphan of a person who:
(i) is described in Subsection (3)(a); or
(ii) during military training or a military conflict,
was killed in action or died in the line of duty in the
military service of the United States or the State.
(4) The Legislature may by statute provide for the remission or abatement of the taxes of the poor.
2002

or damaged by rights-of-way and for associated administrative costs;
(c) driver education;
(d) enforcement of state motor vehicle and traffic laws;
and
(e) the payment of the principal of and interest on any
obligation of the State or a city or county, issued for any of
the purposes set forth in Subsection (6)(b) and to which
any of the fees, taxes, or other charges described in this
Subsection (6) have been pledged, including any paid to
the State or a city or county, as provided by statute.
(7) Fees and taxes on tangible personal property imposed
under Section 2, Subsection (6) of this article are not subject to
Subsection (6) of this Section 5 and shall be distributed to the
taxing districts in which the property is located in the same
proportion as that in which the revenue collected from real
property tax is distributed.
(8) Apolitical subdivision of the State may share its tax and
other revenues with another political subdivision of the State
as provided by statute.
2002

Sec. 4. [Other taxes.]
(1) Nothing in this Constitution may be construed to prevent the Legislature from providing by statute for taxes other
than the property tax and for deductions, exemptions, and
offsets from those other taxes.
(2) In a statute imposing an income tax, the Legislature
may:
(a) define the amount on which the tax is imposed by
reference to a provision of the laws of the United States as
from time to time amended; and
(b) modify or provide exemptions to a provision referred to in Subsection (2)(a).
2002

Sec. 6. [State Tax Commission.]
(1) There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of
four members, not more than two of whom may belong to the
same political party.
(2) With the consent of the Senate, the Governor shall
appoint the members of the State Tax Commission for such
terms as may be provided by statute.
(3) The State Tax Commission shall:
(a) administer and supervise the State's tax laws;
(b) assess mines and public utilities and have such
other powers of original assessment as the Legislature
may provide by statute;
(c) adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of
property among the counties;
(d) as the Legislature provides by statute, review proposed bond issues, revise local tax levies, and equalize the
assessment and valuation of property within the counties;
and
(e) have other powers as may be provided by statute.
(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax
Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by
statute authorize any court established under Article VIII to
adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter
decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and
taxation.
2002

Sec. 5. [Use and amount of taxes and expenditures.]
(1) The Legislature shall provide by statute for an annual
tax sufficient, with other revenues, to defray the estimated
ordinary expenses of the State for each fiscal year.
(2) (a) For any fiscal year, the Legislature may not make an
appropriation or authorize an expenditure if the State's
expenditure exceeds the total tax provided for by statute
and applicable to the particular appropriation or expenditure.
(b) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply to an appropriation
or expenditure to suppress insurrection, defend the State,
or assist in defending the United States in time of war.
(3) For any debt of the State, the Legislature shall provide
by statute for an annual tax sufficient to pay:
(a) the annual interest; and
(b) the principal within 20 years after the final passage
of the statute creating the debt.
(4) Except as provided in Article X, Section 5, Subsection
(5)(a), the Legislature may not impose a tax for the purpose of
a political subdivision of the State, but may by statute
authorize political subdivisions of the State to assess and
collect taxes for their own purposes.
(5) All revenue from taxes on intangible property or from a
tax on income shall be used to support the systems of public
education and higher education as defined in Article X, Section
2.
(6) Proceeds from fees, taxes, and other charges related to
the operation of motor vehicles on public highways and
proceeds from an excise tax on liquid motor fuel used to propel
those motor vehicles shall be used for:
(a) statutory refunds and adjustments and costs of
collection and administration;
(b) the construction, maintenance, and repair of State
and local roads, including payment for property taken for

Sec. 7. [County boards of equalization.]
(1) In each county, there shall be a county board of equalization consisting of elected county officials as provided by
statute.
(2) Each county board of equalization shall adjust and
equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within its county, subject to the State Tax
Commission's regulation and control as provided by law.
(3) The county boards of equalization shall have other
powers as may be provided by statute.
(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax
Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by
statute authorize any court established under Article VIII to
adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter
decided by a county board of equalization relating to revenue
and taxation.
2002
Sec. 8. [Annual statement.]
The State shall publish annually an accurate statement *)f
the receipt and expenditure of public money in a mannei
provided by statute.
200?

Art. XII, § 1

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
5 to 11 [Repealed ]
12 [Common earners — No discrimination ]
13 to 18 [Repealed ]
19 [Blacklisting forbidden ]
20 [Free market system as state policy — Restraint of trade
and monopolies prohibited ]
S e c t i o n 1. [Corporations formation.]
Corporations may be formed under general laws but may
not be created by special acts
1992
S^cs. 2 , 3 .

[Repealed.]

1992

S s c 4. [Suits.]
All corporations may sue and be sued, in all courts, in like
cases as natural persons
1992
S^cs. 5 to 11.

[Repealed.]

1992,1999

S^c. 12. [Common carriers — N o discrimination.]
All common carriers shall provide services without discrimination
1992
S^cs. 13 to 18.

[Repealed.]

1982,1992

S s c . 19. [Blacklisting forbidden.]
Each person m Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment
whenever possible, and a person or corporation, or their agent,
servant, or employee may not maliciously interfere with any
person from obtaining employment or enjoying employment
already obtained from any other person or corporation
1992
Sfcc. 20.

[Free m a r k e t s y s t e m as state policy — Restraint of trade and m o n o p o l i e s prohibited.]
It is the policy of the state of U t a h that a free market system
shall govern trade and commerce m this state to promote the
dispersion of economic and political power and the general
welfare of all the people Each contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy m restraint of trade
or commerce is prohibited Except as otherwise provided by
statute, it is also prohibited for any person to monopolize,
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce
1992
ARTICLE XIII
REVENUE AND TAXATION
Section
1 [Fiscal year ]
2 [Property tax ]
3 [Property tax exemptions ]
4 [Other taxes ]
5 [Use and amount of taxes and expenditures ]
6 [State Tax Commission J
7 [County boards of equalization 3
8 [Annual statement 3
9 to 14 [Repealed ]
S e c t i o n 1. [Fiscal year.]
The Legislature shall by statute establish the fiscal year of
the state
2002
S$c. 2. [Property tax.]
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in
proportion to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible
property, all tangible property in the State t h a t is not exempt
under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution
shall be

778

(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion
to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by
law, and
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing
business in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible
property owned or used by the corporation or person within
the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax
(3) The Legislature may provide by statute that land used
for agricultural purposes be assessed based on its value for
agricultural use
(4) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner
and extent of taxing livestock
(5) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner
and extent of taxing or exempting intangible property, except
t h a t any property tax on intangible property may not exceed
005 of its fair market value If any intangible property is
taxed under the property tax, the income from that property
may not also be taxed
(6) Tangible personal property required by law to be registered with the State before it is used on a public highway or
waterway, on pubhc land, or m the air may be exempted from
property tax by statute If the Legislature exempts tangible
personal property from property tax under this Subsection (6),
it shall provide for the payment of uniform statewide fees or
uniform statewide rates of assessment or taxation on that
property m lieu of the property tax The fair market value of
any property exempted under this Subsection (6) shall be
considered part of trie State tax base for determining the debt
limitation under Article XIV
2002
S^c. 3. [Property t a x e x e m p t i o n s . ]
(1) The following are exempt from property tax
(a) property owned by the State,
(b) property owned by a public library,
(c) property owned by a school district,
(d) property owned by a political subdivision of the
State, other t h a n a school district, and located withm the
political subdivision,
(e) property owned by a political subdivision of the
State, other t h a n a school district, and located outside the
political subdivision unless the Legislature by statute
authorizes the property tax on t h a t property,
(f) property owned by a nonprofit entity used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes,
(g) places of burial not held or used for private or
corporate benefit,
(h) farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by
statute, and
(1) water rights, reservoirs, pumping plants, ditches,
canals, pipes, flumes, power plants, and transmission
lines to the extent owned and used by an individual or
corporation to irrigate land that is
(I) withm the State, and
(II) owned by the individual or corporation, or by
an individual member of the corporation
(2) (a) The Legislature may by statute exempt the following from property tax
(I) tangible personal property constituting inventory present in the State on J a n u a r y 1 and held for
sale in the ordinary course of business,
(II) tangible personal property present in the State
on J a n u a r y 1 and held for sale or processing and
shipped to a final destination outside the State within
12 months,
(III) subject to Subsection (2Kb), property to the
extent used to generate and deliver electrical power
for pumping water to irrigate lands in the State,
(IV) up to 45% of the fair market value of residential property, as defined by statute, and
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John E. S. Robson, A4130
J. David Pearce, A8404
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Intervenor Board of Education of Granite School District
215 South State Street, #1200
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210
Telephone: (801)531-8900
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
3 rd District Civil No. 980901298

Judge Lynn W. Davis
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION and the
UTAH STATE TAX
COMMMISSION,
Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,
KU
3,RD
District Civil No. 010908307

Plaintiff,
(1997-1999 valuation tax years)
v.

"u'tiiOS

SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION and the
UTAH STATE TAX
COMMMISSION,
Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

4th District Civil No. 9900402607

Plaintiff,

(Independent Action)

v.
Judge Lynn W. Davis
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION and the
UTAH STATE TAX
COMMMISSION,
Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.

The Board of Education of Granite School ("Granite"), Defendant-Intervenor/Appellant
herein, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT, FILED by the Honorable
284872_l2
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Lynn W. Davis in the above captioned matters on June 30, 2003, including the Court's
Memorandum Decisions, filed or dated September 20, 2001, June 7, 2002, December 10, 2002
and May 20, 2003, leading up to the Final Order and Judgment.

DATED this Jl^) day of July, 2003.

E. S. Robson
F. David Pearce
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (A[ day of July, 2003,1 caused to be mailed via first
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the
following:
Maxwell A. Miller
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Kelly W. Wright
4618N. 3800W
Morgan, UT 84050
Attorney for Lee Gardner
Craig Smith
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC
60 East5 South Temple, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
Michelle Bush
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney For Defendant Utah State Tax Commission
Mary Ellen Sloan
2001 South State Street, S. 3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bill Thomas Peters
185 South State Street, Ste. 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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